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I  Two worlds of rural and microfinance 
 
1.   What is unique about rural finance? 
2.   Two worlds of rural and microfinance revisited 
3.  A single development finance policy? 
4.  The rural and microfinance market: How many MFIs are there? 








II  What matters in rural and microfinance? 
 
1. First of all: client experience matters 
 
2. What matters in terms of origin, history and culture of rural and microfinance? 
 
 Poverty  matters 
  Informal finance matters 
 History  matters 
 Crisis  matters 
 Development  matters 
 Culture  matters 
 
3. What matters at the level of financial systems? 
 
  Financial systems matter 
 Capital  matters… 
  … but capital transfer has undermined rural finance and development 
  Savings matter – but only under conditions of macroeconomic stability 
  Savings and credit matter – but which one comes first? 
  Financial intermediation matters 
  Financial sector policy matters 
  The legal framework matters 
  Interest rates matter 
  Institutions matter (projects don’t) 
 Competition  matters 
  Prudential regulation matters 
  Effective supervision matters 
 Knowledge  matters 
 
4. What matters at the level of institutions? 
 
  Institutional reform matters: BRI, BAAC, CRDB, CARD 
 Ownership  matters 
  Institutional autonomy matters 
 Viability  matters 
 Efficiency  matters 
 Sustainability  matters 
  Self-reliance matters  
 Outreach  matters… 





 ii  Outreach and sustainability matter – together! 
  Implications for outreach to remote and marginal rural areas 
  MFI portfolio diversification matters 
  Lending technology matters: individual vs. group technologies 
  Innovation and flexibility matter 
 
5. What matters at the operational level? 
 
  Good practices matter (not best practices) 
  Institutional size matters, but not absolutely 
 Profits  matter 
 Incentives  matter 
 Repayment  matters 
 Information  matters 
  Delivery systems matter 
  Financial products matters 
  Loan protection matters 
 
6. What matters to the poor? 
 
  Access to savings and credit matters 
  Rural enterprise viability matters 
  Household portfolio diversification matters 
  The poor themselves matter 
  The non-poor matter 
  Market segments and differentiated financial products matter 
  Culture of labor division matters 
 Autonomy  matters 
 
7. Donor policy and coordination matter 
 
7.1 Transmitting policy to operational departments  
7.2 Cooperation, coordination and co-financing with IFAD and other donors 

















From directed credit to financial systems development  
 
Due to the overall failure of donor-driven subsidized directed credit administered by 
government-owned development finance institutions, the emphasis in development policy 
has shifted to (rural) financial systems development and the building of self-reliant, 
sustainable institutions. While savings-based self-help groups and member-managed small 
cooperatives are more appropriate to remote and marginal areas, there is little to further 
differentiate rural and urban microfinance. Regardless of ownership, type of institution, and 
rural or urban sphere of operation, they ultimately all have to: 
  Mobilize their own resources through savings 
  Have their loans repaid 
  Cover their costs from their operational income 
  Finance their expansion from their profits. 
 
Three worlds of finance continue to exist, in which donors may intervene in very different 
ways: 
  The old world of donor-driven development finance, which need to be transformed 
into sustainable institutions 
  A new world of development finance, comprising viable formal and semiformal 
institutions with a commercial orientation, which do not, or not fully, rely on donor 
support for expansion 
  Informal financial institutions of ancient or recent origin, based on principles of self-
reliance and viability with their potential for innovation and mainstreaming, to which 
donors may contribute.. 
 
There a numerous notable new developments in R/MF; but in the majority of countries, there 
are still major shortcomings that call for country-driven, coordinated interventions. Donors 
with their projects are found in both worlds; but there is an overall move from the old world of 
supply-driven development finance to the new world of demand-driven commercial finance.  
 
  The new world of R/MF  The old world of R/MF 
Policy environment   Prudential deregulation, financial system dev.   Financial repression, no fin. markets  
Legal framework  New legal forms for local R/MFs  Lack of private local R/MFIs  
Non-formal FIs   Opportunities for upgrading to formal MFIs   Millions of informal MFIs ignored 
Semiformal FIs/NGO  Conversions to deposit-taking formal FIs   No standards, no deposit mobilization 
Fin. coops (SACCOs)  Self-reliance; low costs, new-name expansion   Unsupervised, ruined by governments 
Agricultural dev. banks    Reforms towards autonomy, viability, deposit-
taking, portfolio diversification, profits 
Political interference; lack of viability and 
outreach; drain on public resources 
Rural banks (RBs)  Legal framework for private RBs; consolidation 
outreach to the enterprising poor and non-poor 
Lack of opportunities for private capital to 
be invested in local FIs  
Commercial banks  Outreach to microentrepreneurs and the poor 
with appropriate products and services; LBS 
Unable to lend to any sector including 
microentrepreneurs and the poor 
Regulation and 
supervision (R&S) 
MF units in CBs; regulation of RBs and MFIs 
under MF laws; closing of distressed FIs 
Coops, MFIs, AgDBs escape supervision; 
donors keep distressed institutions alive  
Agricultural finance  Self-financing thru savings and profits from 
lucrative (credit-financed) non-agric. IGAs 
Lack of self-financing and commercial 
credit; lack of outreach of AgDBs 
Remote and marginal 
areas 
Self-managed savings-based SHGs and small 
cooperatives operating at low cost 
Futile attempts of donors to drive ill-
suited MFIs into remote areas 
Individual and group 
technologies: 
If properly applied, both can be profitable and 
reach microentre-preneurs and the poor 
Rigid replications without growth of 
outreach and sustainability 
Non-financial services   MFI clients linked to BDS by other agencies  Maximalist approach undermines FIs 
Targeting  Differentiated financial products for 
different market segments 
Targeting undermines outreach and 
viability; excludes entrepreneurs  
Linking banks and 
SHGs/MFIs (LBS) 
Spectacular increase in outreach to the 
poor; profitable if interest rates are free 
Lack of healthy banks with a 
mandate to be of service 
 ivInterlinked schemes  Some success under controlled conditions  Lack of institutional sustainability  
Self-reliance  Self-financing through deposits and 
profits; institutional autonomy  
NGOs, AgDBs barred from deposit-
taking; donor and gov. dependency 
Sustainability  Increasing numbers of self-sustaining 
institutions of any type and ownership 
Donors, gov. fail to insist on perform-
ance standards and sustainability  
Access to financial 
services 
Sustainable access of the poor as users 
and owners to savings and credit services 
No access of many poor and non-
poor to savings, credit, insurance 
 
There are hundreds of thousands of formal and semiformal R/MFIs, and informal institutions 
in the tens of millions. It is therefore recommended: 
  not to focus solely on credit NGOs, as many donors do; 
  to include among the institutions eligible for support formal, semiformal and informal 
financial institutions - in private, cooperative, community or mixed ownership; 
  to place a special emphasis on support to institutions with include the poor as owners 
or customers; 
  to seek for innovative approaches to include the vast numbers of member-owned 
informal financial institutions among the eligible institutions. 
 
 
What matters in rural and microfinance? 
 
1. First of all: client experience matters 
 
Clients have experienced in donor projects that credit can make them poorer or richer: 
  Starting with large loans and term finance, as has been common among donor-
supported AgDBs, is a guarantee for failure. 
  Only small short-term loans allow them to experiment with investments at a 
reasonable risk; to test their ability to borrow, invest, repay and save; to change to 
more profitable investments as opportunities emerge; and to grow rapidly with 
growing internal and external resources.  
  Once they are successful, they need a banking partner which responds to their 
increasing financial needs. This allows them not only to move beyond the poverty 
threshold, but also to create employment for the poor. 
 
2. What matters in terms of origin, history and culture of rural and microfinance? 
 
Poverty matters: Poverty has been at the cradle of rural and microfinance: 
   The poor need financial services, savings more than credit 
 
Informal finance matters: Informal financial institutions in various forms of ownership have 
been based, some since centuries, on the very principles that many credit NGOs find difficult 
to adopt: self-reliance, viability, outreach to the poor as owners or users, competition, 
market-driven innovations, demand-oriented financial products and appropriate risk 
management. 
   Upgrading and mainstreaming through networking, driven by incentives, is one of many 
ways in which donors can support expansion of outreach and financial deepening of 
informal financial institutions. 
 
History matters: MFIs in Ireland, 1720-1950, have demonstrated how regulation makes and 
brakes savings-driven R/MF. MFIs in Germany, 1778-2002, started from informal beginnings 
and evolved, through appropriate regulation and supervision, to cooperative banks and 
savings banks (Sparkassen) with outreach to the majority of the German population in rural 
and urban areas, accounting for 51% of all banking assets. Among the lessons are:  
  Microfinance is not a poor solution for poor countries.  
  Savings-driven microfinance institutions, in cooperative or community ownership, are 
equally feasible in rural and urban areas. 
 v  If properly regulated and supervised, they have great potential in poverty alleviation 
and development, both in rural and urban areas.  
 
Crisis matters: Financial innovations typically emerge as a response to crisis, which must be 
taken as a positive force: 
  Learning from experience means: responding to crisis with innovations. 
  Many MFIs in crisis are kept alive, and prevented from reform, through donor support. 
  MFIs which fail to respond to crises constructively must be allowed to falter: close 
them or reform them! 
 
Development matters: Microfinance is no panacea. It contributes to development, but 
requires a climate of broader development to be fully effective, both macroeconomically and 
at the local level:  
   Targeting the poor only and excluding the non-poor prevents the development of a 
village economy, diminishing the chances of employment, self-employment and 
economic growth of the poor. 
    Donors must respect the autonomy of R/MFIs and refrain from imposing targeting. 
 
Culture matters: The enthusiasm over the new consensus in R/MF has led to a neglect of 
cultural factors, which may be of crucial importance to the clients and corporate culture. Eg, a 
culturally sensitive approach may arrive at two fundamentally different approaches to 
development: 
  Development from above, through the established authorities, is more effective in 
hierarchical or closed societies, which are oriented towards status, tradition and the 
preservation of stability 
  Development from below, through participatory processes, is more effective in 
segmentary or open societies, which are oriented towards competition, 
experimentation, individual achievement and social change 
 
3. What matters at the level of financial systems? 
 
Financial systems matter: Well functioning financial systems must be in place if sustainable 
development and poverty alleviation are to occur. Governments and donors have to realize 
that financial systems and functioning networks of MFIs evolve over long periods of time:  
  Donors can contribute to that evolution, but only in a long-range perspective,  
  and in a coordinated goal-oriented manner.  
 
Capital matters…: The main functions of capital transfer should be: 
The main functions of capital transfer from abroad should be: 
  bridging temporary shortages in loan capital through credit lines;  
  investing in deposit-taking institutions, providing leverage for savings mobilization;  
  strengthening the capacity of R/MFIs to generate their own resources: savings and 
retained earnings. 
 
… but capital transfer has undermined rural finance and development: Reliance on external 
resources, interest rate subsidization and outside administrative control led to misallocation 
of scarce resources, corruption and external debts not matched by productivity increases. 
Under disbursement pressure,  
  donors continue to provide credit lines in substitution of domestic savings, 
undermining the growth of self-reliant financial institutions. 
 
Savings matter  at three levels, provided inflation is low and does not erode the value of the 
savings of the poor: 
  as a service to the poor, to deposit and accumulate their savings in a safe place 
  as a source of loanable funds and self-reliance for (rural) financial institutions 
  as the main source of domestic capital in the national economy. 
 vi 
Savings and credit matter – but which one comes first depends on the rate of return:  
  Savings-first for subsistence and low-yielding activities 
  Credit-first for high-yielding activities. 
 
Financial intermediation matters: Institutions, which offer both savings and credit services 
benefit twofold: 
  they generate their loanable funds on a sustainable basis at a low cost; 
  they benefit from economies of scope; ie, the additional transaction costs of the 
second type of service are substantially lower than those of the first. 
 
Financial sector policy matters: The two main instruments of financial sector policy are: 
  Interest rate deregulation, with interest rate autonomy on deposits and loans 
  Institutional deregulation, to freely establish financial institutions and branches. 
 
The legal framework matters: Appropriate legal forms allow people to establish their own 
financial institutions in private, cooperative or community ownership: 
  Donors should support the financial authorities in providing an appropriate framework 
  The two most important legal forms are privately owned rural banks and financial 
cooperatives. 
 
Interest rates matter: Interest rates are of crucial importance: 
  Caps on interest rates cut down on viability and outreach, rob savers and investors of 
the value of their resources, and ruin MFIs 
  Interest rates above the inflation rate on deposits prevent the erosion of capital  
  Rural market rates of interest must vary widely between institutions and countries, 
reflecting cost of funds, risks and services 
  High interest rates force the borrower into investments with high returns 
  Bringing down interest rates is an internal matter within institutions. 
 
Institutions matter (projects don’t): Institutions are the social capital of a society, providing 
continuity and efficiency. Financial institutions fall into three sectors:  
  the formal financial sector, which is regulated and supervised by financial authorities 
  the semiformal financial sector of institutions officially recognized but not regulated 
  the informal financial sector of institutions which are regulated through local norms 
and traditional law, but are not officially recognized nor regulated by the state. 
Donors may: 
  support a differentiated financial infrastructure with competitive institutions organized 
in networks; 
  support the expansion of sustainable rural financial institutions and their outreach; 
  provide opportunities and incentives for upgrading nonformal to formal institutions; 
  abstain from perverse incentives which enable NGOs, AgDBs and others to 
maintain unviable operations. 
 
Competition matters: An emphasis on the creation of a competitive environment entails: 
  institutional diversity (eg, financial cooperatives, rural banks, AgDB branches) 
  pressure to perform, through effective supervision and enforcement of standards 
  procedures of bankruptcy for non-performing institutions. 
 
Prudential regulation matters: Regulation has failed in many developing countries, but is a 
prerequisite for financial market development. There are two controversial positions: 
  Regulating deposit-taking MFIs only 
  Regulating all MFIs, stabilizing the system and protecting small investors. 
 
Effective supervision matters: Regulation is ineffective if not enforced by supervision. Donors 
should strengthen: 
 vii  the political will and institutional capacity to enforce standards of performance 
  the restructuring or closing of nonperforming financial institutions, instead of 
preventing it through bail-outs - bankruptcy matters! 
  bank superintendencies or central banks and, under delegated supervision, networks 
and auditing apexes of rural banks, SACCOs, and other R/MFIs. 
 
Knowledge matters: The wealth of highly variegated institutional experience has largely 
escaped knowledge management: at the level of donor organizations, countries and regions: 
  Donors will have to take up the challenge of establishing a system of knowledge 
management, perhaps in coopertion with IFAD. 
 
4. What matters at the level of institutions? 
 
Institutional reform matters: There are striking reform of different types of institutions, (eg, 
BRI, BAAC, CRDB, CARD), leaving no excuse for continual support to unviable institutions. 
The following lessons can be drawn: 
  Financial sector policies such as deregulation of interest rates and the provision of 
legal forms for regulated financial institutions are conducive to financial innovations 
  Any type of financial institution can be reformed, including credit NGOs and AgDBs 
  With attractive savings and credit products, appropriate staff incentives, and an 
effective system of internal control, rural microfinance can be profitable 
  The poor can save; rural financial institutions can mobilize savings cost-effectively 
  If financial services are offered without a credit bias, demand for savings deposit 
services exceeds the demand for credit by a wide margin. 
  Incentives for timely repayment work 
  Outreach to vast numbers of low-income people and sustainability are compatible 
  Transaction costs can be lowered, profitability and outreach to the poor increased,  by 
including the non-poor and their demands for widely differing deposit and loan sizes 
 
Ownership matters: Credit NGOs lack ownership; private ownership is most effective, but: 
   depending on culture, institutions can be sustainable and reach the poor under any 
type of ownership; 
   individual or cooperative ownership by the poor as shareholders of MFIs, including 
transformed NGOs, deserve special support. 
 
Institutional autonomy matters: Management autonomy is more important than ownership. 
Donors should: 
   Insist on management autonomy (vis-à-vis government and donor agencies) 
   Refrain from targeting 
   Respect management autonomy in customer selection and loan decisions.  
 
Viability, efficiency, sustainability and self-reliance matter: Donors should support the 
enhancement of: 
  the mobilization of domestic resources, such as savings, equity and borrowings 
  profitability, requiring adequate repayment and coverage of all costs from the margin; 
  cost-effective microfinance products and services: 
  an adequate regulatory framework. 
 
Outreach matters - and so does truth in reporting: In contrast to a ubiquitous credit bias of 
donors and governments, both saver and borrower outreach matter, of small as of large 
institutions: 
   Support both saver and borrower outreach 
   Insist on the reporting of actual, not cumulative figures; the latter conceal the truth. 
 
Outreach and sustainability matter – together! There is strong evidence of the compatibility of 
outreach and sustainability, except under conditions of fixed interest rates: 
 viii   Insist on mutually reinforcing growth of sustainability and outreach 
   Insist on adequate interest rates, allowing for profits above the inflation rate.  
 
Sustainable outreach to marginal rural areas requires recognition of, and support for: 
  The primacy of savings and self-financing, due to the absence of markets  
  Member-owned SHGs and cooperatives, operating at low costs. 
 
MFI portfolio diversification matters as a risk management strategy:  
   Support portfolio diversification of both clients and MFIs 
   Abstain from imposing loan purposes, which create undue risks 
 
Lending technology matter – and should not be a matter of ideology:  
  The poor can be reached by either individual or group technologies, if properly applied 
  Group technologies with joint liability are more effective for small loans to the very poor 
  Individual technologies offer opportunities for graduating to larger loans and sustainable 
movements out of poverty. 
 
Innovation and flexibility matter: Rigid replication of success stories is a recipe for failure. 
   Support financial innovations and adjustments to local culture. 
 
5. What matters at the operational level? 
 
Good practices matter (not best practices): The term best practices evokes notions of optimal 
solutions and leads to inappropriate replications: 
   Support satisfactory culturally appropriate solutions 
 
Institutional size matters, but not absolutely: R/MFIs benefit from economies of scale, but 
there is no best practice in terms of size. 
   Support both, small numbers of large, and large numbers of small, institutions; there is 
no minimum size of sustainable institutions (such as SHGs or cooperatives) 
 
Profits matter: Profits are a source of capital and a major determinant of growth of outreach. 
   Support studies of profitability of different credit and savings products 
   Support organizational efficiency, bringing down interest rates or increasing profits 
 
Incentives matter: While profits are a source of incentive payments, incentives are at the 
same time a major determinant of profits. Donors may support: 
   the transformation of branches into profit centers 
   the introduction of systems of staff performance incentives 
   client incentives (rather than penalties) for timely repayment. 
 
Repayment matters: There are many institutions of different types with repayment rates near 
100%; however, enforcing perfect repayment may not be cost-effective and curtail outreach. 
Donors may support measure to attain adequate repayment based on: 
  appropriate terms like size, instalments, grace periods, purpose, timely disbursement;  
  sound practices of loan enforcement, insisting on timely repayment. 
 
Information matters – in terms of computerized data and personal knowledge of clients. 
   Support adequate Management Information Systems with provide timely information 
 
Delivery systems matter: Institutions lower transaction costs; therefore: 
   Support measures to bring the bank of MFI to the people, shifting transaction costs 




 ixFinancial products matter: 
   Support the development of demand-oriented and cost-effective savings and credit 
products 
   Support efficient collection services (eg, at doorsteps). 
 
Loan protection matters: Life (health, cattle) insurance is a service to clients, but also part of 
loan protection. 
   Support the development of cost-effective insurance services by MFI, particularly to 
cover the default risks arising from AIDS/HIV. 
 
6. What matters to the poor? 
 
Access to savings and credit matters – far more than interest rates. 
   Support institutions which offer both savings and credit 
   Insist on the transformation of credit NGOs into institutions collecting voluntary savings. 
 
Rural enterprise viability matters: The viability of R/MFIs and rural farm and non-farm 
enterprises are mutually reinforcing. 
   Promote linkages with agencies providing BDS in rural areas and to enterprising poor. 
 
Household portfolio diversification matters: IGAs of poor households are usually highly 
diversified, managing the risks of diverse enterprises.  
   Refrain from restricting small loans to single (productive) purposes 
   Encourage loans to IGA with high rates of return, including petty trading 
   Stay away from financing group enterprises – they have usually failed. 
 
The poor themselves matter … and so do the non-poor: In exploitative cultures, the poor may 
prefer access to financial services as a separate group depends on culture and the financial 
infrastructure. Banking with both the poor and non-poor may increase outreach to the poor.  
  Promote financial services to the poor and non-poor in separate or mixed MFIs 
depending on culture 
  Instead of targeting, promote financial products for different market segments. 
 
Culture of labor division matters: Depending on culture, men, women and R/MFIs may opt for 
separate or mixed institutions.  
   Refrain from targeting women 
   Respect the autonomy of women and men and let them decide on separate vs. mixed 
institutions. 
 
Autonomy matters:  
   Abstain from targeting and other impositions 
   Respect the autonomy of the poor, women, local financial institutions and their owners. 
   Support self-selection through particular financial products and services 
 
7. Donor policy and coordination matter 
 
7.1 Transmitting policy to operational departments  
There is an emerging consensus on R/MF policy in the community of donors and 
microfinance practitioners. But transmitting policy to operational departments remains a 
major challenge: 
   Examine the feasibility of a matrix structure, with operational responsibility in the 
operational units and responsibility for project design and performance in the financial 
sector & microfinance unit 
   Create a mechanism for monitoring the effective implementation of policy. 
 
 
 x7.2 Cooperation, coordination and co-financing among donors 
The effectiveness of development assistance can be infinitely increased through donor 
coordination: 
  Synergies are created by donor coordination at national level, including cooperation 
in expert advice, policy dialogue and project supervision 
  Bilateral technical assistance agencies can complement multilateral and bilateral 
financial assistance agencies with grant-financed expertise. 
  Standardized reporting on MFIs will facilitate implementation of policy and donor 
coordination.  
 
7.3 Opening markets… 
The total effect of development assistance is small compared to the importance of opening 
markets in the developed countries for products from developing countries: 
  Donors should make every effort for abolishing agricultural subsidies and opening up 
markets for developing countries 
 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
(1) Sustainable development requires: 
  continual growth and diversification of the rural economy;  
  access of all segments of the population including rural microentrepreneurs, farmers 
and the poor to sustainable financial services such as savings, credit and insurance; 
  provided by self-reliant, sustainable financial institutions 
  in a conducive macroeconomic policy environment. 
 
(2) Sustainable rural microfinance requires local initiative and careful donor support for the 
development of institutions, enabling them to: 
  offer both savings and credit services, 
  mobilize their own resources,  
  have their loans repaid, 
  cover their costs from their operational income  
  finance their expansion to the poor and non-poor from their profits. 
 
(3) Governments, with careful donor assistance, have to provide, 
  a conducive policy framework with deregulated interested rates,  
  an appropriate legal framework for competitive local and national financial institutions 
in private, cooperative and community ownership 
  a system of prudential regulation and effective direct or delegated supervision. 
 
(4) Donors may contribute to the development of rural financial systems through: 
  experts for R/MF units in central banks, R/MF networks and leading R/MFIs 
  capacity building in financial authorities, R/MFI networks and R/MFIs 
  policy dialogue 
  equity investments with leverage through deposits, clear ownership and an exit option  
  assistance for the transformation of MFIs into regulated institutions 
  assistance for the promotion of ownership of financial institutions by the poor 
  no credit lines, except for bridging temporary liquidity gaps  
  making good use of the comparative advantages of multilateral and bilateral donors. 
 
(5) Supporting self-help groups in marginal areas through: 
  networks or federations of SHGs 
  linkages of SHGs with regulated financial institutions. 
 
 




Two worlds of rural and microfinance 
 
 
1.   What is unique about rural finance? 
 
Most people in developing countries live in rural areas; like their countries, they are poor and 
unable to save; and they need to be helped. These plausible assumptions resulted in a well-
intentioned type of development assistance: subsidized targeted credit provided through 
special programs, administered by agricultural (and other) development banks (AgDBs). 
During the 1950s and 60s, directed agricultural credit was synonymous with rural 
development finance. The argument was subsequently extended to urban areas, where 
many of the rural poor had migrated, and they too became beneficiaries of subsidized 
targeted programs; these were mostly financed and administered by NGOs. In both cases, 
AgDBs and NGOs, donors played a crucial role in providing funds and methodologies. 
 
As directed credit failed to deliver the expected results in terms of poverty alleviation and 
development, a new type of development finance has emerged during the 1990s, both in 
theory and in practice, backed by an emerging international consensus
1: 
 
  Agricultural credit has been replaced by rural finance, ie, credit by a range of financial 
services including savings; the emphasis on agriculture by finance for a broad range 
of loan purposes  
  Rural finance has been integrated into the financial system 
  Projects with particular schemes have been replaced by institutions with particular 
financial products 
  Interest rate subsidies have been replaced on the one hand by subsidies for 
institution building and on the other hand by market rates of interest 
  Beneficiaries have turned into customers 
  Charitable poverty-lending has turned into a commercial proposition between 
commercial microfinance institutions and the poor as customers. 
 
Rural and urban areas differ in terms of population density, diversity and social cohesion. 
This may impose limitations on what kinds of institutions, financial products and risk 
management are suitable and profitable; but whether much is unique about finance for rural 
areas remains to be seen. From a systems perspective, differences between rural and urban 
finance, or commercial banks and rural banks, are more likely to be found at lower 
operational levels. 
 
At present, three worlds of finance (as providers or rural and microfinance services) exist 
side by side, both in rural and urban areas: 
 
  The old world of donor-driven development finance, among them AgDBs and NGOs, 
which for their continued existence rely on government and donor funding for equity 
capital, loanable funds and operational expenses, in a number of cases also for 
interest rate subsidies. 
                                                  
1 Inspired by the World Development Report 1989 on Financial Systems and Development, the early 
1990s were a seminal time, also reflected in the biography of this consultant. He contributed a section 
on linking informal and formal finance to the 1989 World Bank report; prepared the first draft 
microfinance policy for the Asian Development Bank in 1993/94, revised and published by GTZ as 
Financial Systems Development and Microfinance in1996; and contributed to the financial sector 
policy of the BMZ in1994. In 1999/2000, he prepared the IFAD Rural Finance Policy. 
 1  A new world of development finance, comprising viable formal and semi-formal 
institutions. Among them are rural banks, some AgDBs, savings and credit 
cooperatives and other MFIs, with microfinance services on a commercial basis for 
various market segments including the poor in rural areas. Large numbers of these 
institutions are self-reliant. Yet there is room for donor support during a limited period 
of time: to increase their efficiency and expand their outreach to the poor. 
  Informal finance (both ancient and new), comprising a multitude of microfinance 
institutions without official recognition and support – among them rotating savings 
institutions, non-rotating savings and credit institutions, moneylenders and deposit 
collectors -, based on principles of self-reliance, viability, competition and outreach to 
all segments of the population. 
 
The fate of an institution – in terms of sustainability, growth and outreach – depends to a 
large extent on the intentions of the founders. The test question is whether an institution 
was established,  
  through local initiative and local capital for mutual self-help or profit-making, 
standing on its own feet from the beginning; 
  through outside initiative and a one-off capital injection, but then put on its own 
feet, either immediately or within a defined period of time; 
  with the expectation of continual government and donor dependency. 
 
 
2.   Two worlds of rural and microfinance revisited 
 
During the last 25 years, but increasingly so during the last decade, notable new 
developments have occurred in rural and microfinance in many countries. Macroeconomic 
stability and deregulation have created a conducive policy environment, which has prepared 
the ground for reforming rural financial institutions, among them community banks, private 
rural banks, savings and credit cooperatives, agricultural development banks, Grameen-type 
banks and credit NGOs. New banking legislation has provided a legal framework for initiating 
regulated microfinance institutions on a commercial basis. This has also created 
opportunities for upgrading and mainstreaming informal financial institutions, of which only 
few donors are fully aware. As a result, increasing numbers of poor people have access to 
financial services – not only as users but also as owners. However, in the majority of 
countries, there are still major shortcomings in rural finance that call for country-driven, 
coordinated interventions. 
 
Table 1:  The old and the new world of development finance 
Donors, don’t support: 
The needs-driven approach  
of the Old World of Development 
Finance 
Donors, do support: 
The institution-building approach  
of the New World of Development 
Finance 
Policy environment   Financial repression: 
Inadequate policy and legal 
environment; slow implementation of 
deregulation; inadequate property 
rights and judicial procedures; 
repressive liquidity requirements; 
TB rates make lending unattractive 
Prudential deregulation - conducive 
to financial system/market 
development: 
Macroeconomic stability; interest rate 
deregulation; ease of setting up 
banks and branches; low minimum 
capital requirements for regulated 
MFIs, enforceable property rights 
 
Legal framework  Lack of appropriate legal forms, 
particularly for privately or 
cooperatively owned local FIs; waste 
of domestic social and financial 
capital 
 
New legal forms for rural banks, 
community banks, and commercially-
operating MFIs; privately financed 
start-up 
 




Institutional focus  Single institutions as a monopoly 
supplier 
Rural financial infrastructure with a 
variety of competing financial 
institutions 
Target group perception  Beneficiaries  Customers 
Selection of clients  Targeting by donors and governments  Self-selection through appropriate 
financial products aiming it different 
market segments 
Outreach  Limited outreach to selected target 
groups such as farmers, the poor 
Potentially all segments of the (rural) 
economy and society 
Incentives  Perverse: leading to misallocation of 
funds, inefficiency, corruption 
Profitable allocation of funds; 
individual performance rewards 
Non-formal financial 
institutions 
The potential for upgrading millions of 
informal financial institutions remains 
largely untapped 
 
Legal opportunities for upgrading to 
formal levels and financial market 
integration  
Semiformal financial 
institutions and NGOs 
NGOs are slow in mobilizing domestic 
resources; lack of standards and self-
regulation; donors support unviable 
NGOs, providing perverse incentives 
for continued dependency 
 
Innovative approaches to poverty 
lending in repressive environments;  
some successful conversions to 
deposit-taking formal intermediaries 
with rapid increase in outreach and 
financial deepening 
Savings and credit co-
operatives (SACCOs) 
Undermined by credit channelling; 
lack of effective R&S by authorities 
and coop networks; wasting a major 
form of social capital 
 
Self-reliance from deposits; low cost 
operations through self-management;





Political interference; lack of viability 
and outreach; poor risk management; 
drain on public resources; failure to 
meet demand for credit and deposit 
services 
Reforms towards autonomy, viability, 
deposit-taking, portfolio 
diversification, profit-financed 
expansion of outreach – with or 
without privatisation 
 
Rural banks (RBs)  Lack of privately owned RBs;   Legal framwork for establishing 
privately owned RBs; consolidation of 
regulated RBs; outreach to the poor 
and non-poor 
Commercial banks  Unable to lend to any sector including 
microentrepreneurs and the poor, 
hence overliquid 
Outreach to microentrepreneurs and 
the poor with appropriate products 
and services; expansion of outreach 




Cooperatives and AgDBs escape 
supervision; lack of MFI standards; 
financial authorities unprepared to 
supervise MFIs; donors keep 
distressed institutions alive  
Central banks establish MF units; 
regulation of rural banks and MFIs 
under microfinance laws; awareness 
of the importance of effective 
supervision and the closing of 
distressed institutions; R&S for credit 
MFIs controversial 
 
Agricultural finance  Self-financing and commercial credit 
insufficient to meet the demand; 
inadequate savings mobilization; lack 
of commercial credit 
Self-financing thru savings and 
profits from lucrative non-agricultural 
IGAs;  non-targeted commercial 
credit replaces preferential sources 
 
Remote and marginal 
areas 
Futile attempts of donors to drive ill-
suited MFIs into remote areas 
Self-managed savings-based SHGs 
and small cooperatives operating at 
low cost 
 
Individual and group  Lack of familiarity with effective group If  properly applied, both can be 
 3technologies:  or individual technologies; ideology 
leads to rigid replications without 
growth of outreach and sustainability 
profitable and reach microentre-
preneurs, farmers and the poor; 
solidarity group members graduate to 
larger individual loans  
 
Non-financial and  
business development 
services  
Maximalist approach undermines 
financial institutions if health, 
nutritition, education and business 
development services are piggy-
backed on FIs without cost coverage  
Provided by SHGs, subsidiaries of 
FIs or other agencies linked to MFIs; 
sustainable balance of social and 
financial development 
 
Targeting  Targeting undermines outreach and 
sustainability; excludes the 
enterprising non-poor and cuts down 
on employment opportunities for the 
poor 
 
Differentiated financial products for 
different market segments, with 
interest rates covering all costs and 
services; employment generation by 
small and microenterprises 
 
Linking banks and 
SHGs/MFIs (LBS) 
Lack of healthy banks with a mandate 
to be of service; lack of LBS exposure 
programs 
 
Spectacular increase in outreach to 




Lack of institutional sustainability on a 
national scale; breakdown under 
conditions of liberalization 
Successful for commodities under 
controlled conditions and in confined 
local environments on a small scale 
 
Self-reliance  Credit NGOs and AgDBs barred from 
deposit-taking; reluctance to strive for 
self-reliance; continued donor and 
government dependency 
Institutions of any ownership type 
may collect deposits and make 
profits: as a basis of self-financing 
and institutional autonomy  
 
Sustainability  Donors and governments fail to insist 
on performance standards and 
sustainability within a defined period 
 
Increasing numbers of self-sustaining 
institutions of any type and 
ownership 
Access to financial 
services 
Vast numbers of poor and non-poor 
lack access to savings, credit, 
insurance, particularly in rural and 
remote areas and in the informal 
urban sector 
Outreach of viable local financial 
institutions to the poor as users and 
owners drastically increased, with 
access to savings and credit 
services; 
some access to insurance/loan 
protection 
 
Many donors with their projects are found on both sides of the table (above), some more to 
the left in the new world of demand-driven commercial finance, some more to the right in the 
old world of supply-driven development finance. This is not the place to exactly classify 
donors. Suffice it to say that they are all on the move towards the left, some more determined 
and at a quicker pace than others. Putting this into operational practice, supervising and 
enforcing the implementation of these principles effectively will remain, as in most other 
donor organizations, a challenge for some time to come.  
 
3.  A single development finance policy? 
 
Rural and microfinance policies cannot be formulated without reference to financial sector 
policy and the wider institutional infrastructure, including the central bank and (other) 
regulatory authorities. Conversely, an agency directed by parliament or its governing board 
towards poverty alleviation cannot in its financial sector policy ignore rural and microfinance. 
Moreover, there are overlaps in geographical coverage: many microfinance institutions 
operate in urban, semi-urban and rural areas; and many towns in rural areas and 
metropolitan fringes cannot be easily classified as urban or rural. In terms of occupations, 
small traders and other microentrepreneurs are found in any type of settlement; and financial 
 4institutions and products do not necessarily differ whether they apply to urban or rural 
microentrepreneurs. In many cases, more depends on a specific situation than on rural-
urban differences. Distinctions are thus blurred, as for example the experience with individual 
and group lending technologies in various countries shows: each may work well or poorly – 
in either urban or rural settings -, depending on the professionalism and commitment of the 
respective institution. Self-help groups, small cooperatives and small community-based 
financial institutions may be solely appropriate in remote rural areas; while, in addition to 
these, commercial banks, rural banks and other larger-scale institutions may also be 
appropriate in cities and areas close to functioning markets; but this does not require 
separate policies. It is therefore recommended: 
 
  To prepare a general development finance policy, comprising an overall financial 
sector policy, a microfinance policy and a rural finance policy. 
 
This should also facilitate donor coordination and cooperation, avoid damaging interventions 
and duplications, and contribute to the integration of financial markets, including the sharing 




4.  The rural and microfinance market: How many MFIs are there? 
 
No systematic information is available on the numbers of the various types of institutions. 
Reported information is highly misleading, ignoring to a large extent institutions established 
without donor support. Eg, the CGAP Micro Banking Bulletin of November 2001 reported 
data on 149 MFIs and drew conclusions from a tiny unrepresentative sample, suggesting that 
there is only a small number of viable MFIs around the world. Yet, in India alone, there are 
142,000 primary rural financial units (with 412m deposit accounts and 72m borrowers) under 
the supervision of NABARD (March 2004); in addition, there are 1.43 million rural SHGs as 
grassroots financial financial institutions, savings-based and credit-linked to some 36,000 
bank branches (March 2005); plus large numbers of credit NGOs and other MFIs. In China, 
there are more than 100,000 rural credit cooperatives (RCCs). On Indonesia (2000), the 
Asian Development Bank reports 54,000 formal and semiformal microfinance institutions, 
among them 2,213 rural banks and 3,855 BRI village banking units. In the Philippines, there 
are 781 rural banks with 1,914 offices; 104 thrift banks with 1,351 offices, 2,200 savings and 
credit cooperatives (out of a total of 36,000 cooperatives with savings and credit 
components), an estimated 500-600 credit NGOs. In Africa, numbers are smaller; but Ghana 
has some 130 rural banks, Nigeria close to 800 community banks (70% of them rural), 
Uganda some 500 credit NGOs. In most Latin American countries, numbers are small, which 
seems to have shaped the views of many in the donor community. In most Arab countries, 
numbers of rural and microfinance institutions are very small; but some do exist, as in 
Jordan, Egypt and Syria.  
 
In informal finance, there is great variation between regions and countries. But worldwide, 
the number of informal financial institutions probably runs in the tens of millions; and the 
number of formal and semiformal rural and microfinance institutions in the hundreds of 
thousands. In addition, there are vast numbers of informal and semiformal institutions with 
savings and credit activities as a secondary purpose. It is therefore recommended: 
 
  Not to focus solely on credit NGOs, as many donors still do; 
  to include among the institutions eligible for support formal, semiformal and informal 
financial institutions - in private, cooperative, community or mixed ownership; 
  to place a special emphasis on support to institutions with include the poor as 
owners or customers, but refrain from luring MFIs into banking with the poor or 
poorest only; 
 5  to seek for innovative approaches of including the vast numbers of member-owned 
informal financial institutions among the eligible institutions. 
 
 
5.  A special role for donors in marginal areas? 
 
Rural-urban and rural-rural differentials: There are usually wide differences between rural 
and urban areas. In rural areas, 
 
  population densities tend to be lower, 
  paradoxically paralleled by larger family sizes and higher population growth rates 
  educational levels tend to be lower, particularly among women 
  physical, institutional and IT infrastructures are poorly developed 
  access to markets and integration of producers and organizations into national 
markets is limited 
  the range of income-generating activities and the degree of economic diversification 
is limited 
  the profitability of economic activities is lower 
  agriculture predominates, with its low profitability and its exposure to co-variant 
physical and economic risks. 
 
Yet, there are also vast rural-rural differentials within and between countries. Eg, population 
densities vary from less than 1/km² in the Sahel to several hundreds in tropical West Africa 
and up to more than 1000/km² in rural Java; educational levels in rural areas vary greatly 
between the Balkans and most other developing countries; the rural economy may be based 
on subsistence crops or cash crops with vastly different profitability rates; risks vary greatly 
according to the degree of diversification (eg, vegetable production), irrigation and market 
proximity. At the same time, absolute poverty may be more severe in cities, as in parts of 
India.  
 
Alternative strategies – for or against marginal areas: All this makes generalizations 
difficult. To remote areas, most of the characteristics in the list above apply. These are areas 
which have not been at the center of attention during the recent microfinance revolution. 
Little systematic work has been done on finance in remote and marginal areas. Several 
alternatives are open: 
 
(1) Given a policy of minimal involvement of foreign experts in the field, to focus on such 
areas as building R/MF units in central banks or transforming credit NGOs into 
regulated financial intermediaries, staying out of remote areas 
(2) To support in-depth field studies of financial innovations in selected marginal areas in 
preparation of future support 
(3) To support institutional innovations in selected marginal areas through support which 
includes foreign experts on a substantial scale and over an extended period of time. 
 
There are no generally applicable best practices that could be cast into recommendations to 
donors. In fact, there is considerable variability in what works and what does not work in 
different countries and geographical areas. Thus, in every particular case, detailed feasibility 
studies are required to work out an appropriate approach, which subsequently requires 
careful monitoring and replanning based on actual experience, including termination of a 
project or closing of institutions if found unworkable or unsustainable. 
 
How donors may support rural finance in marginal areas – through SHGs: Donors may 
want to stick to their focus on marginal areas and the poor; and they may want some more 
concrete advice, which may have to be taken with due caution, first on inappropriate and 
appropriate institutional vehicles of support:  
 
 6  Mostly inappropriate institutional vehicles for marginal areas are commercial banks 
and credit NGOs. 
  Mostly appropriate vehicles are indigenous informal financial institutions on a self-
help group basis; and newly established autonomous self-help groups (SHGs). 
 
Projects of promoting SHGs, networks of SHGs and linkages with banks in marginal areas 
have proven successful in recent years in African Sahel countries such as Mali and Burkina 
Faso,
2 in Asian countries like India
3, Indonesia
4 and Nepal
5, and in Syria
6; the regional 
agricultural credit organizations APRACA and AFRACA and have played prominent roles in a 
number of Asian and African countries.  
 
There are two basic strategies for supporting indigenous or new SHGs as autonomous 
local financial institutions in marginal areas:  
 
(1) Through networks or federations of SHGs, implying that both SHGs and their 
networks are being promoted in the framework of a project 
(2) Through linkages of SHGs with regulated financial institutions like AgDBs, rural banks 
or other types of deposit-taking financial institutions. 
 
In either case, support for new (rather than ongoing) projects requires a thorough feasibility 
study, a long-term perspective or support, long-term experts, the willingness to work, in the 
longer run, towards a legal status for the SHGs or their networks or federations, and possibly 
cooperation with other donors and with regional organizations. 
 
Appropriate partners for the first approach may comprise AgDBs and development NGOs, 
which will eventually transfer their institution-building and –maintenance functions to 
networks of SHGs
7. Partners for the second approach may include AgDBs, rural banks or 




                                                  
2 Cf. Transforming Rural Finance in Africa: The Role of AFRACA in Linkage Banking and Financial 
Systems Development. Internationales Afrikaforum vol. 32 no. 3, 1996: 185-190 
3 Seibel & Khadka 3/2001; Seibel & Dave 11/2002. 
4 Kropp &  Clar de Jesus 4/1996 
5 Staschen 2001; Wehnert U. & R. Shakya, 2001  
6 Seibel 2002 
7 An example are the federations of SHGs (promoted by Nabard) in India with the legal status of 
MACS, a new type of cooperative status. As of end-2002, Nabard has established 500,000 
autonomous SHGs with access to bank services, comprising some 40 million family members of very 
poor rural population segments. 
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Part II 
What matters in development finance, microfinance, rural finance? 
 
 
1.  First of all: client experience matters 
 
Nothing matters as much in rural and microfinance as the experience of the clients. Impact 
studies are of course the proper tool to measure that experience. The results are usually in 
statistical form, providing insights are higher levels of abstraction. Case studies are rarely 
representative and provide only anecdotal evidence. If carried out impartially, they provide a 
picture which is rich in grassroots experience. It is the You-know-it-when-you-see-it 
methodology which permits us to arrive at an assessment, albeit tentative, of the institution 
which provides the client with the particular experience of its financial services. Some 
examples follow, taken from a recent study of Women and Men in Microfinance in Jordan, 
Syria and Uganda.  
 
The man who keeps planting olive trees, which all dry up:  
Omar Al-Qur’an is 55 years old. He has seven children, 16-23 years old, from his first 
wife, who died. He is now married again; his wife is pregnant. In 1991 he received a 
first loan of JD 4,500 ($6,300) with a maturity of 12-15 years from the government-
owned Agricultural Credit Corporation (ACC) of Jordan for planting 300 olive trees and 
building a two-room house. The land is located on a dry plain, and the olive trees died. 
In June 1992, he received an 8-year loan of JD 6,000 ($8,400) from an ACC goat 
smallholder project, which is now fully repaid. In the same year, he planted another 250 
olive trees – from his own funds, he says. These also dried up. In 1999, at a time of 
continued drought, he replanted another 150 olive trees, again from his own resources. 
In May 2000 he received a third loan from ACC: JD 1,500 ($2,100) to add two rooms to 
his house. Omar says that all the dairy produced is consumed by his family; and that 
there is no other source of income other than his pension of JD 150, from which JD 90 
are deducted every month. “Here in these villages, women do not work outside the 
house,” he added. But why does he keep planting olive trees, which all die? “Without an 
olive tree project, I have to return the loan at once,” he explained.  
 
Starting small, on JD 150 ($210),… and growing big: 
Khuland  in the village of Manshiya in Karak  is 30 years old, married, and has 6 
children. As a member of a solidarity group, she received a first loan of JD 150 for six 
months from Jordan Access to Credit Project
8, one of four USAID-supported NGOs, 
and started a small store at her house in 1999. Subsequently she received two loans of 
JD 200 and JD 250, both again guaranteed by her solidarity group, to increase her 
stock. Her monthly payments amounted to JD 26, JD 32 and JD 38, respectively.18 
months after the start, in June 2001, she obtained an individual loan of JD 1,500 
($2,100) with a maturity of 30 months and rented a store. She spent JD 300 on the 
renovation of the store, JD 500 on a refrigerator and JD 700 on stock. Her monthly 
installments are JD 62; this leaves her with a monthly net profit of JD 100. The 
individual loan is secured by two guarantors. Repayments of all four loans are made 
individually at a local bank. As Khuland saw Mohammed in a nearby town obtain a loan 
                                                  
8 The Jordan Access to Credit Project (JACP) is a nonprofit company registered since 1998 with the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). With support from USAID, the project was designed as a 
collaborative effort by the Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF) in the US, the Jordan River 
Foundation, the Cairo-Amman Bank, the Bank of Jordan (BOJ), and the Jordan National Bank (JNB).  
Its funding for the period 1998-2002 is US$4 million for loans to micro, small and medium enterprises 
with an additional 20% capital contribution from participating banks. However, the participating banks 
lost interest; and as of November 2001, all loans are processed through the Housing Bank of Jordan, 
which has the widest delivery network of all banks in Jordan, while CHF assumes 100% of the risk of 
group loans. (For a full case study see Almeyda 2001.) 
 8ofJD 14,000 ($19,600) from JACP, she is confident that further growth depends only on 
her own ability. 
 
Pouring money down the association drain: 
In 1984, 120 men founded the Karak Sheep Smallholders Association in Karak, Jordan. 
Depending on the number of sheep, each member paid contributions of JD 50 to JD 
1000, raising a total capital of JD 23,000 ($32,200). The association’s main activity was 
the wholesale purchase of sheep fodder and its retail sale to members, which worked 
well. In 1997, the sheep smallholders association was offered with opportunity of 
changing into the Association of Yoghurt Maker and setting up a dairy plant: with a 
grant of JD 200,000 from FAO and WFP, a collateral-free loan of JD 13,000 from the 
ACC/IFAD Income Diversification Project with a maturity of 10 years, a start-up 
contribution of JD 6,000 from the National Union of Associations and JD 16,000 (7% of 
the total investment) from their own resources. No payment has ever been made on the 
ACC/IFAD loan. Yoghurt, cheese and butter are made in the home and also retailed by 
the housewives. “Men don’t know anything about yoghurt and cheese-making,” the 
secretary explained. Therefore, the all-male association temporarily employs seven 
women, and a man as overseer. The plant ran into problems of milk shortage and of  
marketing and works only in April and May each year. In Amman, there is an identical 
donor-funded project, with the same problems. 
 
15 trips to the bank for a loan: 
In July 2001, Samirah applied to the Agricultural Cooperative Bank of Syria for a loan of 
SP 50,000 ($1,000), repayable over 5 years. She had benefited from a women’s 
training and credit component of an IFAD-supported project in Jabal al-Hoss, one of the 
poorest areas in Syria. According to social etiquette, it is up to the husband to travel to 
the bank branch for loan negotiations. It took Samirah’s husband Barjas 15 visits to the 
bank branch, plus one visit by the wife to sign the papers. Each visit took 9 hours; 
together with travel expenses, total borrower transaction costs were SP 6,400, paid up-
front – compared to subsidized interest payments of only SP 2,750 during the first year. 
Disbursement was expected a week after our visit in  September; but if the loan officer 
of the ACB branch happens to be absent, yet another trip is due. Project staff hopes to 
bring down the number of trips to three or four.  
 
Having 10 children and opening a store: 
Aminah is 40 years old and has 10 children. She and her husband own 2 ha of 
farmland in Bnan, Jabal al-Hoss. Her husband has a general merchandise store; but 
according to Aminah, “you find nothing in it.” In January 2001, Aminah joined the new 
sanduq, a member-owned MFI, and received a loan of SP 25,000 ($500). Without any 
other resources, she opened a store for household electrical equipment. From the 
income, she bought additional stock, took out some money for the family, and repaid 
the loan after six months. She expects that future loans from the sanduq will finance the 
expansion of her business and generate additional income for the family. 
 
Repeat loans for vertically integrated activities:  
Were Kalifani is a rice farmer and rice trader in Mbale District, Uganda, 45 years old, 
married, with 8 children. He had four loans from Centenary RDB since 1998: Ush 
300,000; 550,000; 800,000; and 2 million $170-$1150). He used the loans as working 
capital on his 2-ha rice farm, for trading, and for the purchase of a rice mill. He employs 
workers and contract laborers. Since 1998, the value of his assets has increased from 
Ush3m ($1725) to Ush7m ($4000).  
 
Building a business empire through ard work, savings and credit:  
Connie Watuwa is around 50, married and has six children. Born in a village, she 
moved to Mbale, Uganda, where she found business opportunities unlimited. In 1971, 
she opened a restaurant with her husband. From the income, she saved money in a 
 9bank and opened a hardware store of her own in 1975. In 1986 she got a first loan from 
the now defunct Cooperative Bank for a lock-up store and, in 1991, a loan from the 
Uganda Women’s Finance Trust for produce trading, buying rice at Ush 400/bag and 
selling it after 3 months at Ush 1000/bag. When Centenary RDB opened a branch in 
Mbale in 1998, she became one of its first depositors. “Centenary is a greener pasture, 
it gives you no headaches”, she said. Within two years, she received three loans: Ush 2 
million ($1150), Ush 4 million and Ush 10 million. As all her payments were on time, 
she recently graduated to a so-called automatic loan of Ush 15 million ($5750) at a 
substantially reduced interest rate. She invested the loans in a second lock-up store, a 
mattress store, and in an extension to the restaurant. She pays for her children’s 
education at Makerere and Nairobi University. The total net worth of her business 
empire is now Ush 230 million ($132,000). Her secret of success is hard work and 
credit: “I worked when I was pregnant up to my 9
th month. I can work. All I need to 
expand is bigger loans.” 
 
Lessons learned: What have these clients learned from the experience? Starting with large 
loans and term finance, as has been common among donor-supported AgDBs, is a 
guarantee for failure. 
Only small short-term loans allow them to experiment with investments at a reasonable risk; 
to test their ability to borrow, invest, repay and save; to change to more profitable 
investments as opportunities emerge; and to grow rapidly with growing internal and external 
resources. Once they are successful, they need a banking partner which responds to their 
increasing financial needs. This allows them not only to move beyond the poverty threshold, 
but also to create employment for the poor. 
 102.  What matters in terms of origin, history and culture of rural and microfinance? 
 
Poverty matters 
Historically, deep poverty has been the cradle of virtually any microfinance movement. The 
driving force in the evolution of microfinance systems has been self-help and self-reliance: 
through savings, self-management, or both. Without these, microfinance institutions have 
remained few and ineffectual. In many of the now mature economies, microfinance has 
played an important role in poverty alleviation, rural development, and the development of 
micro, small and medium enterprises. With successful poverty alleviation and development, 
microfinance institutions have not disappeared, but evolved into mature financial 
intermediaries. They continue to provide a full range of financial services to the lower 
segments of the population.  
 
 
Informal finance matters 
Where and when rural microfinance originated is unknown; but it is certain that it was not in 
Bangladesh during the 1970s. Each country and ethnic group has its own history and 
structure of informal finance. The prehistory of the hui in China and Papua New Guinea, 
arisan in Indonesia, paluwagan in the Philippines, chit funds in India, esusu in Nigeria and 
the West Indies, ekub in Ethiopia, chilimba and likilemba in central Africa, sanduq in Arab 
countries, pasanaco in Bolivia and thousands of other group-based indigenous financial 
institutions – not to mention the ubiquitous moneylenders – has yet to be written; but in some 
countries, such as Nigeria, China, and India, they certainly predate the modern era. (Bouman 
1977; Seibel & Damachi 1982: 73-79) Modernization and the money economy have led to 
numerous innovations in informal financial institutions, but not slowed down their expansion.  
 
Box 1: Daily deposit collection, a financial innovation in West Africa 
Daily deposit collection at doorstep is a financial institution on West African markets, which emerged 
about 50 years ago. It is called ajo among the Yoruba of Nigeria, anago susu in Ghana, nago in Ivory 
Coast (nago or anago = Nigerian), yesyes in Southern Togo, jojuma among the Kotokoli in central Togo. 
The deposit collector may serve anything between 200 and 600 clients a day. From each he collects a 
fixed amount which is then registered on a printed card. By the end of the month he returns the total, 
keeping the amount of one daily deposit as a collector's fee. As to efficiency: On one of the markets in 
Accra I measured the average time it took to make a deposit including walking time: 17 seconds; and 
making a loan just under one minute. In the mid-1980s, the deposit collectors in Accra formed the Greater 
Accra Susu Collectors Association, which was registered and planned to set up its own bank, but the 
authorities were not favorable (Seibel & Marx 1987). By 2000, the Ghana Cooperative Susu Collectors 
Association, with 397 members out of an estimated total of 1040 susu collectors, covered all of Ghana. 
The World Bank, IFAD  and AfDB now support linkages of susu collectors with rural banks. India and 
Indonesia are among the countries were daily deposit collection is practiced by banks.  
   Source: Seibel 4/2001;see also Rutherford 2000: 69-70 
 
There are countries where virtually every adult is a member in one or several; this includes 
many of the poor and the very poor, as found, eg, in July 2002 among Grameen clients in the 
Philippines. Embedded into their own cultural and economic environment, the informal 
institutions teach basic lessons, which many donor-supported MFIs still find difficult to 
accept:  
 
  self-reliance – mobilizing their own resources 
  viability – covering their costs and yielding a positive return 
  outreach – providing access to financial services for all segments of the population as 
users or owners 
  near-perfect competition among large numbers of institutions, combined with a rapid 
turnover of institutions and participants 
  market-driven innovations, including the transition from non-monetary to monetary 
means of exchange, from reciprocity to demand-oriented services, from rotating to 
non-rotating associations, from insurance to savings & credit  
 11  appropriate financial technologies, such as risk management through a zero-cash 
principle. 
 
There are a number of cases of upgrading where informal institutions have evolved into 
formal institutions, such as arisan into rural banks in Indonesia, dhikuti into a finance 
company in Nepal, and informal into formal chit funds in India (Seibel 2001/4); where 
indigenous informal institutions have entered into linkages with banks (Seibel & Marx 1987); 
and where donors have promoted linkages of indigenous or newly established groups with 
banks in Asian and African countries, eg, through AFRACA and APRACA, – the largest such 
program in India (Seibel 3/2001), with 461,000 self-help groups as of 3/2002. And there are 
countries like Cameroon, Nigeria and Nepal where indigenous informal financial institutions 
are the main source of capital for micro and small enterprises.  
 
Box 2: From dhikuti to finance company: upgrading a RoSCA in Nepal  
Until the 1950s, the dikur or dhikuti was a rotating savings association among Thakali traders in Nepal. 
Since then, it has spread throughout all towns and most ethnicities in Nepal and become the small 
businessman's self-help bank (Seibel & Shrestha 1988). As business opportunities grew, secret bidding 
replaced allocation by lottery. For example, at the first turn, the lowest bidder may accept a pot of $1000 
for $600, reducing individual contributions by 40% or putting the balance of $400 into an emerging loan 
fund. In response to a new law (1992) permitting the establishment of finance companies and without 
donor involvement, some dhikuti have started to register as finance companies, which has substantially 
their functioning. Perhaps the most prominent is the Himalaya Finance and Savings Company, offering 
various savings and credit products to the poor and near-poor throughout Nepal, including contractual 
savings and term finance. Up to 600 daily savings collectors collected deposits of US$ 0.15 per day, 
before new central bank regulations led to a reduction in the number of collectors and an increase in the 
size of deposits. (Seibel & Schrader 1999) 
 
Donors and donor institutions like CGAP have large left the enormous potential of indigenous 
informal financial institutions (IFIs) unexplored. In fact, in many countries, large numbers of 
self-reliant IFIs and small numbers of unsustainable credit NGOs supported by donors exist 
side by side: a continual challenge. Given the prevalence of the informal financial sector and 
its capacity for adaptation and innovation, special support may be given to IFIs.  
Box 3: Stepwise incentives for mainstreaming  IFIs 
Mainstreaming  Incentive 
1.   Registration  Basic training (accounting) 
2.   Reporting  Financial management training 
3.   Legal status  Consultancy services in good practices
4.   Prudential norms Liquidity exchange and refinancing 
5.   Supervision Accreditation with a seal of quality
This may entail: (a) enhancing management skills and operational practices; (b) transforming 
rotating and nonrotating savings and credit associations, funeral societies and deposit 
collectors into financial intermediaries with a permanent loan fund; (c) availing of 
opportunities for upgrading to regulated financial institutions; and (d) entering into linkages 
with banks. A particular strategy to be 
supported by donors, in partnership 
with an NGO, might be upgrading & 
mainstreaming through networking 
among informal IFIs as an 
incentives-driven option.  IFIs may be 
offered assistance to establish 
networks and enlist as members. The 
network may be registered under a suitable legal form: as an association, a foundation, a 
cooperative, a company and eventually a formal apex. In a stepwise order, the network may 




Is microfinance a special solution for poor people in poor countries? 
Attributing the origin of microfinance to recent initiatives misses not only the historical depth 
and scale of microfinance, but also centuries of experience, which means: learning from trial 
and error, failure and success. The beginnings in Europe were all informal and small-scale, 
including informal savings clubs in many countries during the 18
th century, among them the 
box clubs in England. 
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microfinance movement, until a cap on interest rates brought it down 
The birth of microfinance in Europe dates back to tremendous increases in poverty since the 
16
th century, with the first known bank for the poor established in Holland round 1618. In 
Ireland, loan funds emerged in the 1720s, using peer monitoring to enforce the repayment in 
weekly instalments of initially interest-free loans from donated resources. After a century of 
slow growth, a boom was initiated by two events: (a) a special law in 1823, which turned the 
charities into financial intermediaries by allowing them to charge interest on loans, enabling 
them at the same time to collect interest-bearing deposits; and (b) the establishment of a 
Loan Fund Board in 1836 for their regulation and supervision. Around 1840, around 300 
funds collected deposits and provided small loans to the poor, with an outreach to 20% of 
households in Ireland. The funds offered three times higher deposit rates than commercial 
banks and started cutting into their core business. Corporate politics led to a cap on interest 
rates in 1843 and caused the gradual decline of the loan funds during the second half of the 
19
th century, until they finally disappeared in the 1950s. (Steinwand 2001: 52-54). 
 
The case of Germany, 1778-2002: How self-help, regulation and supervision created the 
world’s largest microfinance system 
Microfinance with the poor in Germany has three roots: community-based savings funds, 
mostly in urban areas; and two movements of savings and credit cooperatives: one rural and 
one urban. Having learned from the early Irish charities that charity is not sustainable, the 
first thrift society was established in Hamburg in 1778, the first communal savings bank 
(Sparkasse) in1801. As the movement spread, the influx of savings forced the savings banks 
to expand their credit business, including agricultural lending. After the hunger year of 
1846/47, Raiffeisen reinvented the wheel of microfinance: first by establishing a rural charity 
association in Weyerbusch in 1847; and then, after his charities failed, the first rural credit 
association in Heddesdorf, 1864. This was paralleled by Schultze-Delitzsch’s the first urban 
credit association in 1850, who insisted on self-help without charity from the beginning. 
Between 1885 and 1914, the number of rural cooperatives in Germany increased from 245 to 
more than 15,000 and spread to many other countries. (Von Pischke 1991: 43-46; Steinwand 
2001: 54-60). 
 
The spectacular success of microfinance in Germany, which pushed moneylenders and 
private banks out of business, is due to several factors:  
 
  self-help and self-reliance, based on savings mobilization  
  local outreach with lasting house-banking relationships 
  the evolution of a legal framework: 1838 first Prussian savings banks decree; 1889 
first Cooperative Act; 1934 Banking law covering all financial institutions including 
savings banks and cooperative banks 
  abandoning joint and several liability of cooperative members in favor of limited 
liability in 1889 
  Effective delegated supervision through own apexes, evolving in four stages: 
o  1860s-80s voluntary auditing, resulting in financial difficulties during the 1880s 
o  1889 mandatory auditing by cooperative auditing federations or freelance 
auditors, resulting in financial difficulties of cooperatives under freelance 
auditors during the 1920s 
o  1934 mandatory auditing by separate auditing federations for all banking 
networks including cooperatives and savings banks supervised by the Bank 
Superintendency 
o  1971 DGRV as national cooperative auditing federation with 11 regional and 6 
specialized auditing federations; paralleled by DSGV for savings banks 
 
Results: This has resulted in a financial system in Germany in which 51.4% of all banking 
assets are held by (former?) microfinance institutions (Dec. 1997 data), with: 
 
 13  39,000 branches (49% cooperative banks, 51% savings banks) 
  75 million customers (40% cooperative banks, 60% savings banks 




  Microfinance is not a poor solution for poor countries.  
  Savings-driven microfinance institutions in cooperative or community ownership are 
equally feasible in rural and urban areas. 
  If properly regulated and supervised, they have great potential in poverty alleviation 




Crises play a crucial role in the development of financial systems and institutions.
9 The 
beginnings of any movement are usually flawed, and innovations are usually crisis-driven.  
Eg, the crisis of charities in Ireland and subsequently in many other European countries led 
to the emergence and rapid spread of financial intermediaries, which collect interest-bearing 
deposits and convert them into interest-bearing loans. In Germany, the collapse of savings 
and credit cooperatives during the 1880s and again during the 1920s led to effective 
regulation and supervision. The collapse of numerous rural banks in the Philippines during 
the early 1980s, which had relied on cheap government funds, led to a strengthening of their 
deposit base and more professional financial management. Similarly, in Indonesia, the oil 
crisis of the early 1980s led to the reform of what is now the BRI Microbanking Division; and 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997 Indonesia produced a healthy rural banking sector. Vast 
numbers of institutions gained their strength only out of a total reform in response to 
technical bankruptcy, such as Bank Rakyat Indonesia in 1983, Centenary Rural 
Development Bank in Uganda in 1992, and Commercial Microfinance Equity Building Society 
in Kenya in 1993. Crises must therefore be allowed to happen, instead of being prevented by 
government or donor interventions: 
 
  Many MFIs in crisis are kept alive, and prevented from reform, through donor support. 
  MFIs which fail to respond to crises constructively must be allowed to falter. 




Microfinance is frequently considered as a panacea, intended to sustainably alleviate poverty 
and produce development. This ignores the interrelatedness of economic development and 
poverty alleviation in virtually all countries since the industrial revolution. In recent years, all 
major donors have been emphasizing poverty alleviation as if this could occur without 
development. A functioning financial system is a prerequisite of sustainable development, 
and microfinance a prerequisite of poverty alleviation. Financial institutions must be in place 
if development is to occur; but sustainable poverty alleviation hinges ultimately on economic 
development on a broader scale. This applies first of all to national economies, where only 
economic development and the development of the financial system together will lead to 
poverty alleviation. This also applies to the village economy, where microfinance services for 
the poor will not suffice in generating development. If a village does not develop as a whole, 
microfinance services to the poor may ensure their survival and improve their livelihood, but 
will not transport them sustainably across the poverty threshold. Targeting the poor or very 
poor or poor women only and excluding the non-poor prevent village development, 
diminishing the chances of employment, self-employment and economic growth of the poor . 
                                                  
9 Historically, there is an inverted relationship between business cycles and cycles of innovation. 
Peaks of innovation are generally preceded by economic recession and crisis. (G.Mensch, Innovation 
und industrielle Evolution. Berlin 1974) 
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Culture matters 
Cultures are immensely complex and influence institutions and behavior, but not in simple 
and determinate ways. Social, political, economic and religious culture are all intertwined, but 
to a certain extent may co-vary. Eg, there are marked differences between (a) stratified, 
centralized, hierarchical, or closed societies, which tend to be oriented towards status, social 
stability, tradition and obedience; and (b) segmentary, decentralized or open societies, which 
are oriented towards individual achievement, competition and social mobility. The differences 
between such societies are mirrored in closed vs. open organizations, which were the object 
of much research during the 1960s and 1970s. In many African countries, hierarchical and 
segmentary societies exist side by side. Yet, culture is not among the topics discussed in the 
microfinance community – as if the CGAP-inspired belief in best practices (rather than good 
practices!) ruled out culture as a determinant of variation in rural and microfinance.  
 
That financial institutions have their own corporate culture and that such cultures widely differ 
goes almost without saying, taking for example the cultures of the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh with its group lending approach, headed by a leader venerated as charismatic, 
as opposed to the BRI Microbanking Division in Indonesia or Centenary Rural Development 
Bank in Uganda, which both do very well with individual lending in terms of profitability and 
outreach to the poor and have no venerated leader. But the influence of a national or ethnic 
culture on rural and microfinance (probably less so on commercial banks) is another matter. 
There is one obvious exception: the influence of religion in a number of Islamic countries, 
where banks (as in Iran and Sudan) and microfinance institutions (as in Jabal al-Hoss, Syria, 
see Box  ) adhere to Islamic banking. 
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, social scientists revisited Max Weber’s classical study about 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Interest in culture might have been due the 
the struggle between communism and capitalism and the emergence of Japan as yet 
another culture with a different corporate ethic; but that interest seems to have been 
eliminated by the apparent convergence of the 1990s. 
 
In my own first studies during 1967-68 of informal finance among all 17 ethnic groups of 
Liberia, I found that hierarchical societies like the Kpelle tended to form well-organized 
savings and credit associations with regular meetings, while segmentary societies like the 
Krahn are more individualistic and unstructured in their approach to savings and credit 
(Seibel & Massing 1994). In a more systematic comparative study of the hierarchical Igala 
and the segmentary Tiv in central Nigeria during the mid-1980, Marx, Mönikes & Seibel 
(1988) arrived at similar results, but also found that the Igala oppose experimentation and 
change, preserving the prerogatives of their elite; while the Tiv experiment with a variety of 
financial institutions and are oriented towards competition, growth and progress. The main 
conclusion was that according to culture, there are two fundamentally different approaches to 
development, a finding which differed at the time from conventional wisdom: 
 
  Development from above, through the established authorities, is more effective in 
hierarchical or closed societies, which are oriented towards status, tradition and the 
preservation of stability 
  Development from below, through participatory processes, is more effective in 
segmentary or open societies, which are oriented towards competition, 
experimentation, individual achievement and social change 
 
During the 1980s, GTZ supported a dialogue on sociocultural factors of development; but this 
did not focus specifically on financial systems and institutions. At the time it seemed more 
important to work on the fundamentals of rural finance (Schmidt & Kropp 1987) than cultural 
differences. The topic has rested, perhaps long enough. Given the consensus on 
fundamentals in the microfinance community, has the time come to revisit culture? 
 
 153. What matters at the level of financial systems? 
 
Financial systems matter 
The importance of financial systems in development has long been ignored in the 
development literature, assuming that capital mattered, but not financial institutions and 
systems as such – until McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) demonstrated their crucial role. 
Subsequently, the World Development Report 1989 focused on Financial Systems and 
Development (including attention to informal finance, but not rural finance). They comprise a 
legal and regulatory framework, a financial infrastructure of different types of financial 
institutions organized in different networks with various apexes for liquidity exchange, 
supervision, training and information dissemination, and sound practices. A full and adequate 
range of financial services can only be provided in the framework of a functioning financial 
system, not by isolated providers.  Well functioning financial systems, including rural finance, 
must be in place – weathering crises and evolving over time - if sustainable development and 
poverty alleviation are to occur. Governments and donors have to realize that financial 
systems, (rural) microfinance institutions and networks of MFIs are no quick-fix solutions; 
they evolve over long periods of time, as in Europe since the 17
th and 18
th century; or in 
Indonesia where the first rural MFI was established in 1895. Donors can contribute to that 
evolution, but only in a long-range perspective, and in a coordinated goal-oriented manner. 
The evolution of a stable and sustainable system must have primacy, not the protection of 




The success of the Marshall Plan in the reconstruction of Europe after World War II inspired 
the newly emerging multilateral and bilateral donors to use capital transfer as main 
instrument of development. Capital transfer became a core element in the modernization 
theory of the 1950s and 60s. To implement the transfer at national level, development banks 
– including agricultural development banks (AgDBs) - were established in virtually every 
developing country. On the basis of expert advise provided by donors like the World Bank, 
capital transfer came with a special financial technology: channelling funds at subsidized 
interest rates to target groups and for purposes as decreed by government and donors, 
without offering deposit facilities. Each development bank was capitalized by donors and 
placed under a separate law, which exempted it from prudential regulation and supervision. 
The main functions of capital transfer from abroad should be: 
 
  bridging temporary shortages in loan capital through credit lines, eg, of the BRI village 
units in Indonesia during their early expansion phase
10; or, currently, of some 160 
MFIs in the Philippines, to initiate Grameen banking services to rural poor; 
  investing at the donor’s own risk in deposit-taking rural financial institutions, providing 
leverage for the mobilization of savings;  
  strengthening at the same time the capacity of domestic institutions to generate their 
own resources: loanable funds through savings mobilization and equity through 
retained earnings (profits). 
 
… but capital transfer has undermined rural finance and development 
This combination of sole reliance on external resources, interest rate subsidization and 
outside administrative control led to a situation of misallocation of scarce financial resources, 
widespread corruption and a rising burden of external debts not matched by productivity 
increases. Redtape and inefficiency were extreme – and in many cases continue to be so 
                                                  
10 Bridging temporary shortages of loanable funds was the intention of a World Bank loan to BRI’s 
rural microbanking units reformed in 1984. But when the loan came through in 1989, the unit desa 
network, which had turned out to be highly productive, was already self-reliant in funds. Hence, BRI 
used the loan for other, unproductive, purposes and, with the Asian financial crisis and the resulting 
devaluation of the Rupia, saw its domestic value reduced to about 20%.  
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and incomes, outreach to the poor), they also were a drain on public resources, requiring 
annual budgetary allocations. Capital transfer for directed credit has not only undermined 
AgDBs and other development finance institutions, but the health of the financial system and 
the economy as a whole. In many countries, capital transfer has made the country poorer, 
the AgDBs insolvent, and the farmers, who established a track record of defaulting, 
unbankable (Box B4 ). 
 
Box 4: The widow who started big with a loan from ACC in Jordan… and failed for a lifetime 
Rajwa Thniebat is a 50 years old widow in the area of Karak in Jordan, with five children. Her husband 
died 10 years ago. In January 2000, she received a collateral-free loan of JD 2,100 (US$ 3,000) from 
the IFAD-supported Income Diversification Project of the Agricultural Credit Corporation, repayable 
over 8 years. She bought 20 sheep, which have increased to 24, and went into dairy production. By 
September 2001, she had sold only 2 kg of goat butter and 6 kg of jameed cheese. Everybody 
produces jameed and butter, there is no market, she says. She has made two payments of JD 30 
each, which covers less than the interest due. ACC keeps writing letters and visiting her, but to no 
avail. With a loan of JD 200 for 8 months, less than one-tenth of the actual loan amount and period, 
Rajwa could have purchased the equipment and bought milk from sheep farmers for dairy production 
instead of raising sheep. This would have given her the opportunity of testing the market and her 
entrepreneurial skills at a manageable risk. Now she is stuck with a bad loan and ineligible for another 
to go into a more profitable line of business. It was the loan terms imposed on her that made her start 
big - and fail big. She would like to apply for a loan to buy a sewing machine at a cost of JD 120; but 
she is a defaulter, and the amount is  too small to be financed from an ACC loan.  
 
 
With loans like to one to Rajwa Thniebat and a lack of institutional autonomy, many of the 
AgDBs in Africa and Latin America have collapsed, despite donor technical assistance as in 
the case of the Cooperative Bank of Uganda (by USAID) or Fonader in Cameroon (by GTZ). 
Many of the remaining ones are technically bankrupt. Lessons have been learned as to what 
it takes to generate and allocate theoretically unlimited amounts of capital from domestic 
resources; but under disbursement pressure,  
 
  governmental, non-governmental and multilateral donors continue to provide credit 
lines in substitution of domestic savings; 
  thereby undermining the growth of self-reliant financial institutions. 
 
 
Savings matter - but only under conditions of macroeconomic stability 
In most European countries, once the new MFIs started mobilizing savings, they quickly 
experienced an abundance of deposits, demonstrating beyond doubt that the poor not only 
can save, but that depositing and accumulating savings in a safe place is one of their basic 
needs. Similarly many informal (non-rotating) savings and credit associations accumulate 
capital beyond their management capacity. A few have evolved into formal institutions; most 
however distribute the paid-in capital and the profit among the members at year’s end and 
take a fresh start. Savings matter at three different levels: 
 
  as a service to the poor, who need to deposit and accumulate their savings in a safe 
place, for consumption, the self-financing of investments and insurance purposes 
  as a source of loanable funds and a basis of self-reliance for (rural) financial 
institutions 
  as the main source of domestic capital in the national economy. 
 
However, there is a qualifyer: at the household level, financial savings only matter if there 
are positive real returns, ie, if the interest rate on deposits exceeds the rate of inflation. 
Otherwise, the value of the savings are eroded. In this case, people will save in kind and 
assets. From a development viewpoint, this is not efficient, as it will not contribute to the 
growth of the financial system and the economy.  
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The pervasiveness of the need and ability to save is one of the lessons taught by history, but 
time and again forgotten and not easily learned by development agencies. The importance of 
domestic resources and the savings potential of the poor and the non-poor is one of the 
great rediscoveries during the 1980s and 90s. When government-owned BRI, a century-old 
AgDB in Indonesia, introduced an attractive savings product with positive real returns at 
village level in 1983, this became the foundation of unprecedented growth of what is now one 
of the largest microfinance institutions in the developing world: with 27 million savings 
accounts, a saver-to-borrower ratio of 10:1 and excess liquidity of $1.5 billion - even during 
the Asian financial crisis when donors flocked to Indonesia to help the poor with credit lines. 
Similarly, when Misereor helped Yayasan Purba Danarta, an NGO in Semarang, to establish 
Bank Purba Danarta in the early 1990s as a commercial bank offering both savings and 
credit services to the poor in Central Java, it was inundated with savings, at a saver-to-
borrower ratio of 20:1. Centenary Rural Development Bank in Uganda, a trust transformed 
into a bank for the rural poor, has 280,000 savers and 22,000 borrowers (Box  ). Rutherford 
(2000) describes the many ways in which the poor save. Seen from another perspective: in 
numerous developing countries including the Balkans
11, the banking system is overliquid; ie, 
it mobilizes more savings in urban and rural areas than it is able or willing to lend.
12  
 
Yet, all over the developing world,  
 
  savings continue being “the forgotten half of rural finance” (Vogel 1984). 
 
Donors tend to ignore savings at institutional and sectoral levels. A striking example (one of 
many!) is the World Bank’s Second Coffee Improvement Project (SCIP II), 1990-1997, in 
Kenya, where the Nordic Countries have been trying to build self-reliant cooperatives since 
the 1960s: 
 
“The savings of coffee farmers are far higher than their borrowings… (but) are not used as the 
source of funds for coffee loans and this is mainly because cheaper donor funds are available 
through SCIP II.” Instead, the emphasis of the World Bank and Coop Bank, through which the 
SCIP loans were channelled, should have been on “promoting local self-financing and increased 
rural SACCO institution building,“ (PriceWaterhouse 1997: 76-82) 
 
Table 2: Savings and credit in rural SACCOs/UBSs in Kenya, June 1993-1996 (in mn Ksh) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Total savings  939 1312 1880 2345 
Total credit 









Excess liquidity  457 916 1371 1754 
SCIP II loans disbursed: 
Cherry Advance Payment System 
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Savings and credit matter – but which one comes first? 
Both savings and credit matter, for investment as well as consumption-smoothing. From a 
client perspective, there is little difference as Rutherford (2000) as shown. In both cases, 
payments may be made in regular, monthly or weekly, instalments. In the case of a loan, the 
lump sum is received at the beginning of a stipulated period; in the case of savings at the 
end. The primacy of savings-first vs. credit-first depends on the rate of return: savings-first for 
subsistence and low-return activities, particularly in agriculture, credit-first for high-return 
 
11 After the chaos: a survey of finance in Central Europe. The Economist, September 14-20 2002. 
12 Among the reasons –rarely addressed by donors – are excessive liquidity and minimum capital 
requirements and risk-free high returns on treasury bills. 
 18activities such as trading, agricultural processing and other microenterprises, with returns 
















Donors may contribute to speeding up the savings & credit cycle, with growing amounts of 
savings and credit. However, the autonomy of households has to be respected, particularly 
concerning their basic orientation: Security-oriented households will tend to increase the 
share of self-financing through savings; entrepreneurial households will tend to increase the 
share of external financing, compensating the higher risk with higher expected earnings. 
However, among the poor and particularly the very poor, the transition to risk-taking on a 
larger scale is a difficult one, as a recent IFAD (7/2002) evaluation among the Grameen 
clients of various types of MFIs has shown.  
 
 
Financial intermediation matters 
There has been a long-standing tradition of donor support - with equity, credit lines and 
technical assistance - to credit institutions, including AgDBs and credit NGOs. Yet, as long as 
they remain credit institutions, they are not self-reliant, they are rarely viable, and their 
outreach remains limited. On the other hand, savings institutions without credit services 
either have little appeal if the interest rate is not attractive, as in the case of many post office 
savings banks; or they may have difficulty in investing them profitably. Regardless of their 
temporary preference, customers require both savings and credit services. CARD Rural 
Bank in the Philippines realized the limitations of deposit mobilization when it started 
collecting savings from the non-poor, without giving them access to loans, in order to 
generate loan funds for poor women. The solution is financial intermediation, ie, the 
transformation of many small amounts of savings into a few large amounts of credit: a type of 
finance which emerged in Europe towards the end of the 15
th century and spread rapidly. 
Financial intermediation benefits the customers, institutions and the financial system as a 
whole, whose growth is driven by the growth of financial intermediation. Institutions, which 
offer both services, benefit twofold: 
 
  they generate their loanable funds on a sustainable basis and at a lower cost; 
  they benefit from economies of scope; ie, the additional transaction costs of the 
second type of service are substantially lower than those of the first. 
 
The Microbanking Division of BRI in Indonesia (Box  ) and Centenary Rural Development 
Bank in Uganda (Box B5 ) are two institutions which have successfully focused on financial 
intermediation in 1984 and 1992, respectively, with substantial gains in outreach and 
profitability.  
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intermediary 
Centenary RDB is a commercial bank that provides deposit, credit and money transfer services 
indiscriminately to men and women of lower income. By insisting on loan recovery and cost coverage, 
it has reached more men and women in rural areas than any other institution in Uganda. With 
minimum deposits of $6 and minimum loans of $30, access barriers are low. 11 of its 16 branches, 
73% of its deposits and 82% of its loans are in rural areas. Established by the Catholic Church of 
Uganda as a trust fund in 1983, it developed a strength in savings mobilization but performed poorly 
as a financial intermediary. In 1990, the political will to reform the fund evolved in the board, resulting 
in the fund’s transformation into a commercial bank in 1993. With donor support, the bank evolved into 
the most successful financial intermediary in Uganda. This has made the bank the African flagship of 
rural and agricultural banking, combining sustainability with outreach to the rural poor and 
demonstrating the feasibility of agricultural lending. With equity capital of $6.8m and total assets of 
$49.85m as of December 2001, it has mobilized $39.9m from 280,00 depositors, provided $14m in 
loans outstanding to 22,000 small borrowers, earned returns of 4% on average assets and 28% on 
equity, and, since 1999, finances its expansion from its profits.  
   Source: Seibel & Almeyda 2001a 
 
 
Financial sector policy matters 
Conducive policies not only provide a framework for the development; in many cases, they 
generate development. According to a World Bank source, the institutional and policy 
framework forms the “macro-level social capital” of a society (Quinones & Seibel 2001: 195). 
At the macroeconomic level, exchange rate deregulation, liberalization of agricultural prices, 
and the deregulation of foreign trade are essential. Eg, if the national currency is overvalued 
and allows for the importation of agricultural products at artificially cheap rates – favored by 
many politicians who live on the granting of import licences -, local crops and livestock are 
not competitive, farmers revert to subsistence production and are unable to save, and rural 
financial intermediaries have no market. The two most important instruments of financial 
sector policy are: 
 
  Interest rate deregulation, allowing each institution to determine interest rates on 
deposits and loans 
  Institutional deregulation, permitting local, national and international investors to 
establish financial institutions and branches. 
 
A prominent example is Indonesia, which deregulated interest rates on time deposits and 
loans as instruments of monetary control in 1983; removed restrictions on the establishment 
of domestic and foreign banks and bank branches in 1988; substantially reduced rural 
directed credit programs in 1990, phasing out interest rate subsidies; and enacted a new 
banking law in 1992 with authorization for only two types of banks: commercial banks and 
rural banks (BPR). This resulted in a massive increase in the number of financial institutions 
and in the volume of deposit mobilization and lending.  
 
As the experience in the Latin American southern cone has shown in the 1980s, there is a 
prerequisite for financial deregulation which McKinnon (1973) had overlooked: 
macroeconomic stability. Under high and volatile inflation rates, the financial sector cannot 
develop. Without macroeconomic stability, deregulation might lead to the collapse of the 
financial system.  
 
 20Box 6: How policies work: Deregulation and financial deepening in Indonesia 
In response to the change in the policy environment, banks engaged in vigorous campaigns 
of savings mobilization and credit delivery at market rates of interest. To attract deposits, 
banks competed with each other by offering a variety of savings products with different terms 
and highly positive real returns. From 1982, the last pre-deregulation year, to 1996, the last 
pre-crisis year, savings and time deposits (excluding demand and foreign exchange 
deposits) increased 67-fold in nominal and 21-fold in real terms. Savings deposits, which are 
mostly held by low-income groups, grew 126-fold in nominal terms and 39-fold in real terms, 
indicating that the poor do save and respond to incentives to save.  
 
During the same period, 1982-96, the ratio of M2/GDP, a standard measure of financial 
deepening, increased from 17.5% to 
54.2%. The shape of the curve 
presents visual evidence that 
policies work: The curve shows a 
definite incline after 1984, the first 
full year after interest rate 
deregulation. 1986 is the year of a 
major devaluation of the Rupiah, 
resulting in some leveling-off of the 
curve. This is followed by a sharp 
incline of the curve after 1988, the 
year of banking liberalization. In 
1990 it started to level off when Bank 
Indonesia pulled the tight money 
policy brakes. 
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The legal framework matters 
In a conducive policy environment, the next thing that matters is the legal framework as part 
of the regulatory environment. Banking and microfinance laws can make or break the 
development of rural financial institutions, as shown above in the historical development in 
Germany and Ireland, respectively. In many cases, the passing of an appropriate law (with 
provisions for prudential regulation and supervision) suffices to attract private capital for the 
establishment of large numbers of financial institutions. In most countries, such laws are 
absent. The Philippines (1952), Indonesia (1988) and Nigeria (1990) are countries where 
rural or community banking laws have led to the emergence of up to 2,000 privately 
capitalized rural banks. In the Philippines, the central bank has also enabled moneylenders 
to register as Private Investors, which has increased their outreach and brought down their 
interest rates. In Vietnam, where some 7,200 cooperatives had collapsed after the 
introduction of the market economy, a new law in 1990, together with highly effective 
supervision by the central bank, has led to the emergence, within four years, of over 1,000 
cooperative People’s Credit Funds. All these institutions have their own networks and 
apexes. Such laws have also provided a framework for the upgrading of informal financial 
institutions. 
 
Ill-conceived laws can hamper the development of rural and microfinance. Examples are the 
Loi Parmec in West Africa, which restricts the establishment of regulated microfinance 
institutions to cooperatives and puts a cap on interest rates, preventing private capital 
owners (eg, les grands planteurs) from investing in individually owned rural banks; the 
microfinance law of Morocco, which bars MFIs from deposit-taking, depriving rural clients 
from a service and the MFIs from a source of capital; and the microfinance law of Ethiopia, 
which until recently fixed the interest rate and limited the technology to group lending.  
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Interest rates on loans and deposits and the margin between them are of crucial importance 
to the viability of financial institutions. Many socialist countries have prevented the growth of 
their financial sector and have strangulated their financial institutions with an inverted interest 
rates structure, with deposit rates exceeding lending rates. As shown above, the deregulation 
of interest rates in Indonesia has led to an upsurge of savings and credit; it has also been at 
the root of the transformation of BRI into one of the world’s largest rural financial 
intermediaries.  
 
It is of crucial importance that all interest rates are positive in real terms, ie, above the 
inflation rate, lest the poor, most of whom are net savers, are robbed of the value of their 
savings. Inflation imposes an inflation tax on all consumers – to the benefit of the state (“the 
biggest thief”). This is deplorable not only from an economic, but also from a moral viewpoint, 
as in countries with Islamic banking, where many depositors refuse to accept interest rates. 
In Iran for instance, with inflation rates of 20-50%, the state has thereby imposed a usurious 
negative interest of 20-50% on deposits, among them vast numbers of the rural poor as 
customers of Bank Keshavarzi. 
 
For a fair and effective interest rate regime, calculations have to start with deposit rates 
above the inflation rate, calculate financial costs on that basis and add administrative and 
risk costs. The practitioner by be guided by the following example of BRI Microbanking 
Division the microfinance benchmark institution, with three-year averages for 1994-96 
(CGAP/GTZ, 1997: 24): 
 
Inflation  rate:      8% 
Interest expense on deposits:    9.7% 
Average real return to depositors:     1.7% 
Total operational costs:     6.5% 
  Salaries and allowances  2.9% 
  Office and other costs    2.1% 
  Provision for loan losses  0.8% 
 Supervision  cost    0.8% 
Interest and other operational income 21.9% 
Profit      5.5% 
 
To arrive at this result, BRI pays 13% interest on SIMPEDES, its most attractive deposit 
product, of which 11.5 % if paid directly to the depositor and 1.5% into a lottery. On 
KUPEDES, its unique microcredit product with monthly instalments and no grace period, it 
charges 2% flat per month, which equals 43% effective per year, but pays back a quarter of 
the interest charges if all payments are on time (as is the case among 95% of borrowers). 
 
Average interest rates of different institutions and countries cannot be directly compared as 
they are contingent upon average loan size and the cost structure, include the costs of 
special services (such as doorstep collection).  
 
In Thailand, a more advanced country with much larger loan sizes ($2,042) and 
extraordinarily high efficiency, BAAC (with a borrower outreach to 88% of all farm 
households) charges only 12%, but would require 14-15% break even.  
 
In the Philippines, some 162 Grameen replicators, among them rural banks, cooperatives 
and NGOs, charge effective interest rates on very small loans of around 50-80% (and 
substantially more if compulsory savings and various deductions are calculated)
13. Centenary 
RDB in Uganda charges close to 50% effective p.a., but brings this down to almost 30% on 
automatic loans of successful repeat borrowers. In contrast, in many countries, there are 
                                                  
13 GTZ, in its financial sector study of 1998, calculated the effective annual interest of first cycle 
Grameen loans, including all fees and deductions, of CARD Rural Bank and NGO at 167%. 
 22donor-supported credit NGOs which charge even higher interest rates, but fail to break even. 
In SHG-based informal financial institutions, I have observed, between 1967 and 2002, self-
imposed interest rates around 10% per month – up to 10% on one-day loans to petty-traders, 
who still make a substantial profit.  
 
These observations lead to the following conclusions: 
  Rural market rates of interest must vary widely between institutions and countries, 
reflecting cost of funds, risks and services 
  High interest rates force the borrower into investments with high returns 
  Net returns on 6-months microloans are frequently a multiple of the amount borrowed, 
which explains why borrowers are concerned about access to loans, not the interest 
rate. 
  The worst mistake a donor or government can make is placing a cap on interest 
rates, cutting down on viability and outreach, robbing savers and investors of the 
value of their resources, and ultimately eliminating the MFIs 
  Bringing down interest rates is an internal matter within institutions, mainly as a result 
of increased efficiency under conditions of competition. 
 
 
Institutions matter (projects don’t) 
Institutions are the social capital 
14of a society. Their advantage lies in the continuity and 
efficiency of their services; institutions reduce transaction costs. Financial institutions fall into 
three sectors:  
 
  the formal financial sector, which falls under the banking law and the regulation and 
supervision of financial authorities 
  the semiformal financial sector of institutions officially recognized but not regulated 
  the informal financial sector of institutions which are regulated through local norms 
and traditional law, but are not officially recognized nor regulated by the state. 
 
The competitive advantage of each sector and type of institution depends on the 
conduciveness or hostility of the policy environment, on the appropriateness of the legal 
framework, and on the costs of regulation and supervision. Conducive policies and 
appropriate legal forms have led to the elimination of most types of nonformal financial 
institutions in the developed world,
15 but not so in developing countries.  
 
The most important rural financial institutions are – varying greatly in importance by country – 
AgDBs and their branches, rural banks, savings and credit cooperatives, and NGOs. In many 
countries, where 60-80% of the population is rural, their offices number in the hundreds or 
thousands (and more than 100,000 in India and China); but their share of total assets of all 
financial institutions is mostly below 5% - an enormous market for expansion of outreach and 
financial deepening. Donors may: 
 
  support the development of a differentiated financial infrastructure with competitive 
institutions organized in networks; 
  support the expansion of sustainable rural financial institutions and their outreach to 
the rural poor 
  provide opportunities and incentives for upgrading nonformal to formal institutions, as 
these are the only ones with an unlimited growth potential within integrated financial 
markets; 
                                                  
14 Social capital is defined as the shared normative system of a group or organization which shapes 
the capacity of people to work together and produce results according to the group‘s or organization‘s 
purpose. (Seibel 5/2000) 
15 Informal finance in the developed world is mostly marginal, as in the form of savings clubs in 
German pubs, but not always entirely insignificant, as in the case of loan sharking among the poor in 
the US and Italy.  
 23  abstain from perverse incentives which enable NGOs, AgDBs and other financial 
institutions to maintain unviable and unsustainable operations. 
 
Competition matters 
Competition is the main driving force of institutional efficiency and outreach to different 
segments of the market. Competition leads to lower transaction costs, lower interest rates, a 
wider range of financial products, better services, and services to poorer sections of the 
population. An emphasis on the creation of a competitive environment entails: 
 
  institutional diversity (eg, financial cooperatives, rural banks, AgDB branches) 
  pressure to perform, implemented to effective supervision and enforcement of 
standards 
  procedures of bankruptcy for non-performing institutions. 
 
In many cases, donors have done just the opposite: they have prevented diversity by 
supporting, during a given period, a single type of institution (eg, Grameen banking, credit 
NGOs, AgDBs); supporting non-performing institutions over extended periods of time; and 
preventing the closure of terminally ill institutions. A good example is the Kenya Women 
Finance Trust, which is doing reasonably well and, over twenty years, could easily have 
evolved into a self-reliant profitable bank, as some of its competitors did (Box ). 
 
Box 7: How donors undermine competition: the case of KWFT  
The Kenya Women Finance Trust, founded in 1981, received donor grants of $9.8m over the last ten 
years and attained a remarkable degree of outreach and, compared to the industry average, an 
excellent level of repayment performance. By September 2001, it had 50 delivery units, over 40,000 
members and 26,700 active borrowers, mostly poor women, with Kshs 350m loans outstanding. The 
repayment rate is 96%. Its portfolio of outstanding loans amounts to $4.7, though it received double 
the amount in grants. With an operational self-sufficiency ratio of 91% (up from 48% in 1996), it still 
does not cover its operational costs – despite the fact that it does not incur financial costs, as all its 
loanable funds are grant money. Its core problem is the lack of a legal status which would allow for 
deposit mobilization. Without this authorization, KWFT has been unable to adequately respond to its 
clients’ demands for deposit facilities. As donor funds continue to flow (eg, from IFAD), there is no 
need for KWFT to turn into a bank and stand on its own feet. (IFAD  3/2002) 
 
 
Prudential regulation matters 
Prudential regulation of financial institutions, defining standards of performance for different 
types of institutions, is of crucial importance for their health and growth. Through massive 
support to unregulated institutions like development banks and NGOs, donors have 
historically prevented undermined. In recent years, the need for regulation has been 
recognized on principle.  
 
Yet, donors have been reluctant to insist on regulation. In various countries, there has been a 
number of factors militating against the regulation of MFIs:  
 
a)  regulation (frequently not enforced) has not prevented the collapse of commercial 
banks; 
b)  corrupt governments may use regulation to gain undue influence on MFIs;  
c)  imprudently applied commercial banking standards (such as excessive minimum 
capital and liquidity requirements) may have a stifling effect on microfinance;  
d)  inappropriate commercial banking regulation (such as interest rate controls) are 
imposed on MFIs; and  
e)  central banks lack experience in rural and microfinance, are remote from the realities 
of rural and microfinance, are subject to biased advice by a single donor or 
consultant, and may pass inappropriate regulation (as in Morocco, where MFIs are 
barred by law from deposit-taking; or in Ethiopia where they were restricted to 
Grameen-type group lending at controlled interest rates). 
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But as many donors – including the World Bank, regional development banks and bilaterals - 
continue to provide funding regardless of the existence of prudential regulation or regulatory 
initiatives, progress has been slow. It is only recently that systematic and coordinated 
attempts are made by donors to introduce prudential regulation for MFIs, as in Uganda 
where GTZ and Donors work closely together with other donors.  
 
While there is agreement, theoretically, on the importance of prudential regulation, there is 
one major unresolved issue in the rural and microfinance community: whether regulation 
should apply to all MFIs or deposit-taking institutions only. There are two positions: 
 
  Deposit-taking MFIs only: “The basic principle of regulation and supervision is that its 
overriding objective is to protect the financial system from unsound practices by 
deposit taking institutions and thereby...  to protect small and uninformed depositors”. 
(R. Vogel) 
 
  All MFIs: “The financial system as a whole needs to be protected, including small 
investors, and not just the small and uninformed depositors. The overriding objective 
of regulation and supervision is to protect the stability of the financial system as a 
whole and prevent a loss of confidence which may result from the breakdown of ANY 
financial institution - be it a lending, deposit-taking, insurance, leasing, investment or 
universal banking institution!”  
 
Very small institutions, including large numbers of IFIs, may be excluded from compulsory 
regulation. For small institutions, regulation should be voluntary and promoted through 
incentives, as described above for IFIs. In any case, the tendency to evade regulation would 
be much reduced if there strong positive incentives to join the community of regulated 
institutions and if donors ceased to offer perverse incentives. 
 
 
Effective supervision matters  
Regulation and supervision are usually seen together. But experience has shown that 
prudential regulation together with a weak and ineffective supervision system do not suffice. 
Rarely have donors paid attention to effective supervision in addition to prudential regulation; 
I am not aware of any case where this has been a conditionality for support to the financial 
sector. What is required is effective supervision, carried out by organs of supervisions with 
teeth to bite, ie, with the willingness and ability to close down non-performing institutions, or 
enforce their restructuring or consolidation. The Philippines is one of the countries where the 
central bank has been quite rigid in imposing standards; this has led to a consolidation of 
commercial and rural banks and has exempted the sector from the worst consequences of 
the Asian financial crisis.  
 
The sector where this ability and willingness has been notoriously absent is the cooperative 
sector; this has been the main factor in the downfall of cooperatives in developing countries – 
just as effective supervision has been a dominant success factor in countries like France, the 
Netherlands and Germany. Vietnam is one of the few developing countries where a new 
breed of cooperatives, the so-called People’s Credit Funds, have been effectively and 
successfully supervised by the central bank through its branches.  
 
In the commercial and rural banking sector, the importance of effective supervision and 
enforcement has been largely overlooked. This explains why many banks in developing 
countries have collapsed. Eg, Indonesia was one of the model countries of prudential 
regulation during the first part of the 1990s – until the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, 
which demonstrated the weakness of effective supervision in many Asian countries. South 
Korea was one of the few countries which quickly reacted, cleaned up their banking sector, 
and went back on the path of growth. Indonesia and Japan did not. These two countries have 
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be the political will to enforce: 
 
  Without the fundamentals of prudential regulation and effective supervision, including 
the political will to enforce standards, much of donor support to financial institutions is 
wasted.  
  Governments and donors must enforce the restructuring or closing of nonperforming 
financial institutions, instead of preventing it through bail-outs. Bankruptcy matters! 
  Bilateral donors, in cooperation with their supervisory organs at national and network 
level, should focus on strengthening capacities of regulation and effective supervision 
   Special assistance should be given to the financial authorities in charge (bank 
superintendency or central banks) and, within the framework of systems of delegated 
supervision, to the networks and auditing apexes of the various types of financial 




There is an immense and rapidly growing body of experience in rural and microfinance; 
particularly during the past decade, many developing countries have seen an explosion of 
rural and microfinance institutions. This has been paralleled by training, exposure visits and 
exchange of experience through conferences at national, regional and international levels. 
CGAP has played an important role in condensing the accumulated experience in 
operational manuals. But the wealth of highly variegated institutional experience has largely 
escaped knowledge management, at the level of donor organizations, countries and regions. 
Knowledge management in rural and microfinance and associated training and exposure 
opportunities will present a big challenge for some time to come. 
 
 264.   What matters at the level of institutions? 
 
Institutional reform matters 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia, the big bang reformer: There is now an increasing 
number of cases of institutional reform, some of them spectacular, the hardest to reform 
being the agricultural development banks (AgDBs). The flagship of AgDB reform is the 
Microbanking Division of government-owned BRI. In the early 80s, repayment rates of its 
700,000 rural borrowers were around 50%, despite heavily subsidized interest rates (around 
10%). Reform came with a big bang, when interest rates were deregulated in 1983 and the 
bank was given the option of closing its more than 3,000 rural units or standing on its own 
feet. With TA from USAIDHIID since 1984, it introduced an attractive savings product at 
11.5% interest paid to savers, offered non-targeted individual loans with monthly instalments 
and no grace period at 2% flat p.m., equivalent to 44% effective p.a., and provided powerful 
incentives: savers participated in a lottery; borrowers received a refund of 11% if they repaid 
all instalments on time (reducing the effective annual rate to 33%); branches became profit 
centers; and staff received substantial performance incentives. This made the Division on of 
the world’s largest and most profitable rural institutions. (Box B8 )  
 
Box 8: BRI Microbanking Division: How a reformed AgDB revolutionized rural finance 
The case of BRI is evidence that, in a deregulated policy environment, a government-owned 
agricultural development bank can (a) be transformed into a highly profitable, self-reliant financial 
intermediary, and (b) turn into a major microfinance provider, offering carefully crafted microsavings 
and and non-targeted loans from  to low-income people at market rates of interest. Making good use 
of government seed money and a World Bank loan during an initial phase, it has fully substituted, 
since 1989, savings deposits for external loans as source of funds.  
 
Within a six-year period,1984-90, BRI became a model case in Asia of the transformation of an ailing 
government-owned AgDB into a viable and self-sufficient financial intermediary with ever-increasing 
financial resources and numbers of customers, competing successfully with an array of other local 
financial institutions. Further strength was added to BRI’s microfinance operations during the Asian 
financial crisis: When the Indonesian banking system collapsed, BRI’s Microbanking Division remained 
profitable. At the peak of the crisis, 6-8/1998, it attracted 1.29 million new savers during that three-
months period alone, while demand for credit, because of perceived uncertainties, stagnated. This 
generated excess liquidity in excees of $1bn.  
 
With an outreach of 26m million savings accounts and 2.7 million active borrowers (12/2000) through a 
network of 3,700 village units operating as profit centers, BRI covers its costs from the interest rate 
margin and finances its expansion from its profits. Its performance is outstanding, with a past-due ratio 
is 2.5%, an annual loss ratio of 1.1%, operational self-sufficiency of 413%, financial self-sufficiency of 
135%, return on assets of 5.4%, self-reliance (Deposits to Loans) of 244% and an efficiency 
(Administrative costs/Average loans outstanding) of 8.4%. With their non-targeted rural finance 
operations, the BRI Microbanking Division has weathered the Asian financial crisis well, as the only 
profitable government banking operation in Indonesia. (Seibel & Maurer 2001) 
 
 
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, Thailand, the gradual 
reformer: BAAC is an example of gradual learning and reform. It has gone through four 
major phases: 1966-74, laying the foundation for individual lending to farmers through joint 
liability groups; 1975-87, expanding its lending operations through access to commercial 
bank and donor funds and consolidating its operations by reducing loan channeling through 
cooperatives; 1988-96, striving for viability and self-reliance, under conditions of controlled 
interest rates, through savings mobilization, improved loan recovery and increased staff 
productivity; since 1997, adjusting to prudential regulation by the central bank and 
diversifying into non-agricultural lending. The result of gradual reform has been the largest 
relative outreach by any AgDB: 88% of farm households, combined with institutional viability. 
In 3/2000, it ha 5m borrowers with $5.7bn loans outstanding, 8.3m savers with $4.5bn 
deposits, a past-due rate of 16.5%, operational self-sufficiency of 228% and financial self-
sufficiency of 98%. (Maurer et al., 2000) 
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Centenary Rural Development Bank, Uganda, reformed through individual 
lending: CRDB was established in 1984 by the Catholic bishops of Uganda as trust fund for 
the rural poor. With assistance from IPC, a German consulting firm, it was transformed in 
1993 into a commercial bank and turned into an African flagship of rural and agricultural 
banking, with a saver outreach of 280,000, a borrower outreach of 22,000,  and high 
profitability (Box .. above). Its success is based on an individual lending technology package 
described below (see: Lending technology matters). 
 
Equity Building Society, Kenya, from housing finance to rural finance: EBS was 
established in 1984 as a building society  for long-term housing loans. By December 1993, it 
was declared technically insolvent by the central bank, with non-performing loans of 54% and 
capital fully eroded. In 1994, with donor support, reform started from within over a five-year 
period and enabled EBS to transact business like a commercial bank. 65% of its portfolio is 
agriculture-based.  
 
There is a strong emphasis on timely repayment, which is driven by incentives and a 
holistic approach: (i) an assessment of the ability of the household as a whole to repay and 
its track record of savings and repeat loans, rather than collateral; (ii) decentralized lending 
(“knowing the customer”); (iii) repeat loans without red-tape (granted within one day); (iv) 
decreasing interest rates on repeat loans; (v) lending for an array of purposes; (vi) monthly 
instalments deducted from the client’s savings account.  
 
IBS is now one of the most vibrant financial institutions and probably the strongest 
microfinance provider with a rural and agricultural emphasis in Kenya. It is owned by 2,367 
shareholders, most of them farmers and microentrepreneurs. From 1995 to 2001, EBS 
underwent a process of rapid growth which is still ongoing: Total assets grew from Ksh 213m 
to 1.9bn; the number of depositors grew from 28,000 to 105, 000; deposit balances  grew 
from Ksh 123m to 1.6bn; the number of borrowers grew from 347 to 20,000; loans 
outstanding grew from 35m to 762m; profits grew from 7m to 54m (before tax); equity grew 
from 9m to 227m. 
 
Center for Rural and Agricultural Development in the Philippines, an NGO-
turned-rural bank: CARD started operating in 1988, using grant funds for lending to 150 
rural people organized in associations. At a repayment rate of 68%, it was doomed. Two 
reform measures turned it around and made it the flagship of NGO reform: adoption in 1989 
of the Grameen approach of lending through solidarity groups of 5 five poor women; and 
registration as a regulated rural bank in 1997, combined with financial innovations such as 
savings mobilization from the non-poor and access to refinancing by PCFC, an apex for 
MFIs. CARD stands on two pillars: an NGO with 21 branches, which are easy to establish; 
and a rural bank with 8 branches for voluntary deposit mobilization, the consolidation of 
financial operations, and for graduating successful Grameen borrowers to a new individual 
lending program. It now (5/2002) has 92,500 depositors, 56,500 borrowers, a repayment rate 
of 99.7%, an operational self-sufficiency ratio of 145%; a financial self-sufficiency rate of 
119%; a return on assets of 5.2% and a return on equity of 18.8% (fully attributable to 
Grameen banking!).  CARD provides training and exposure services to NGOs and rural 
banks.  
 
Table 3:  The evolution of CARD, 1988 – 5/2002 


















1988 150  68.0         
1989 89  100  .089  89     
1990 307  98  .59  307     
 281991 468  96  .66  468  0.31   
1992 949  98.2  1.76  949  0.25   
1993 1,711  98.1  2.63  1,711  0.46   
1994 3,547  98.0  7.30  3,547  0.77   
1995 4,240  98.8  11.41  4,240  0.46  0.42 
1996 6,844  99.2  22.35  6,844  0.77  0.68 
1997 10,868  100  34.21  10,954  1.22  0.73 
1998 20,617  99.9  82.79  20,882  1.00  0.73 
1999 28,531  100  149.6  40,367  1.00  0.86 
2000 35,704  99.7  387.2  68,127  1.19  1.12 
2001 49,784  99.9  379.0  84,037  1.41  1.27 
5/2002 56,400  99.7  410.8  92,471  1.45  1.19 
 
 
Several lessons can be drawn from the experience of reformers in various countries: 
•  Financial sector policies such as deregulation of interest rates and the provision of legal 
forms for regulated financial institutions are conducive to financial innovations 
•  Any type of financial institution can be reformed, including credit NGOs and AgDBs 
•  The poor can be reached by either individual or group technologies, if properly applied 
•  With attractive savings and credit products, appropriate staff incentives, and an effective 
system of internal control, rural microfinance can be profitable 
•  The poor can save; rural financial institutions can mobilize their savings cost-effectively 
•  If financial services are offered without a credit bias, demand for savings deposit services 
exceeds the demand for credit by a wide margin. 
•  Incentives for timely repayment work 
•  Outreach of a financial institution to vast numbers of low-income people and financial 
self-sufficiency (including viability and self-reliance) are compatible 
•  Average transaction costs can be lowered, and both the profitability of a financial 
institution and the volume of loanable funds can be increased by catering for both the 




Many NGOs and AgDBs suffer from the fact that they have no proper owner. As a result, 
there is no accountability and no profit orientation. In the case of AgDBs, privatisation has 
been a common solution in Latin America. In most African and Arab countries, this is 
rejected, with the result of ailing institutions which are a drain on public resources and, in 
Africa, the collapse of many. However, there are notable exceptions, including BNDA in Mali, 
BNA in Tunisia, Bank Keshavarzi in Iran, BRI in Indonesia and BAAC in Thailand. Thus, one 
has to be careful with generalizations.Much depends on national culture and traditions of 
public accountability. However, what is ultimately more important is a system of effective 
regulation and supervision together with internal control. Powerful incentives for individual 
performance and a system of branches as profit centers, as in BRI, may offset some of the 
disadvantages of public ownership 
 
This applies similarly to NGOs; but the problem of ownership is more difficult to solve, 
particularly when donors inject equity and NGOs evolve into banks. Constructs of fake 
individual ownership (backed by contracts between individual owners and the NGO) are 
legally doubtful. An easy solution would be cooperative ownership by the clients; this 
however has rarely been accepted the board and management of NGOs. Rigid internal 
control, regulation and supervision, careful selection of board members, and staff 
performance incentives are all the more important.  
 
The failure of cooperatives has frequently been attributed to a lack of effective control by the 
member-owners and by undue influence of the management or board, including collusion 
 29and corruption. However, for many reasons, there may be no alternative to cooperative 
ownership. Again, the main issue here is effective regulation and supervision; the People’s 
Credit Funds in Vietnam are an excellent example (see also chapter B 2, History matters). 
 
One has to be careful recommending privatisation across the board, particularly as 
privatisation is no substitute for effective regulation and supervision. 
 
 
Institutional autonomy matters 
Management autonomy is crucial for a financial institution, more so than ownership. The 
secret behind the success of the Microbanking Division of government-owned BRI lies in its 
autonomy, which included the freedom to reject all and government and donor supported 
projects; and the reason for the loss-making operations BRI’s retail division lies in the lack of 
that autonomy.  
 
Autonomy of rural and microfinance institutions has three major components: interest rate 
autonomy; autonomy in customer selection; and autonomy in all loan decisions. Full respect 
of donors for the autonomy of financial institutions means abstaining from any form of 
directing and targeting. Interference by donors (or government agencies) with any type of 
management decision also means that they are responsible for the results, including losses. 
Taking this argument seriously has far-reaching consequences, particularly for donors like 
the World Bank, regional development banks and other lenders. Of course, this should not 
keep donors from supporting institutions with a certain self-selected mandate, such as rural 
finance. But once selected, a donor who does not wish to undermine an institution’s 
autonomy has to stay away from targeted credit lines; there is little more such a donor can do 




An organization is viable to the extent that it covers its costs, including losses, from its 
operational income (the brake-even point). The viability measure commonly used for donor-
supported MFIs is the operating self-sufficiency (OSS) ratio:  
Financial income/(financial costs + operating costs + loan loss provision). 
 
Highly profitable microfinance institutions may cover their costs several times over, as in the 
case of BRI with OSS of 413%, and BAAC with 228%, which are extraordinarily high. Most 
donor-support MFIs have an OSS below 100%, which means they are loss-making. CARD in 
the Philippines (see Box) is one of many such institutions which started low: with an OSS of 
25% in 1992; but of the few which despite (!) donor support made it across the break-even 
threshold: 122 in the year it registered as a rural  bank and up to 145% as of May 2002.  
 
Financial institutions which are not donor-supported, such as banks and financial 
cooperatives do not normally calculate operational and financial self-sufficiency ratios but 
profits, expressed in terms of return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE); 
shareholders are only interested in the latter.. Examples of profitable MFIs are:  
Producers Rural Bank Bank in the Philippines with a ROA of 1.5% and ROE of 11.2% 
Centenary Rural Development in Uganda with a ROA of 4% and a ROE of 28% 
CARD in the Philippines with a ROA of 5.2% and a ROE of 18.8%. A credit NGO more 
typical of donor-supported MFIs is ASKI in the Philippines, with a remarkable outreach to 
13,729 borrowers , among them 10,626 Grameen clients, but a ROA of –1.7% and a ROE of 




OSS, ROA and ROE are measures of cost efficiency, but not of efficiency in a wider sense. 
Efficiency in the wider sence must take two other factors into consideration: the interest rate, 
 30which of course determines operational income, and the cost of special delivery services 
provided by an institution (such as services provided in the village or at doorstep instead of 
transferring them to the clients.  
 
Profits may be high despite high costs– provided an institution is able to charge interest rates 
which are above their costs. Profits may even be high in spite of high delinquency rates – if 
an institution charges interest rates which cover these losses. Eg, Shinta Daya, a rural bank 
on Java, has consistently made profits despite a default ratio around 10%, because its 
interest rate covered all costs and losses. Conversely, profits may be low despite a high 
degree of efficiency, not only because of relatively low interest rates but perhaps also 
because of additional costly services (lender transaction costs) provided by the institution, as 
is the case of Grameen replicators in many countries.  
 
There is no consistency in the definition of efficiency in the wider sense. Eg, efficiency may  
be expressed in terms productivity, measured as: 
   Number of active clients/Operational officer; or  




Adequate financial services can only be permanently and reliably provided by sustainable 
financial institutions with adequate microfinance products and cost-effective outreach to the 
poor. In a wider sense, the sustainability of rural and microfinance institutions hinges on 
several factors: 
a)  the mobilization of their own resources, particularly locally mobilized savings and 
equity, but also borrowings from commercial banks or other external sources and 
equity participation; 
b)  profitability, which requires adequate repayment performance and coverage of all 
costs from the interest rate margin; 
c)  cost-effective microfinance products and services: 
d)  an adequate regulatory framework, which comprises appropriate legal forms for rural 
and microfinance institutions, adequate regulation and effective supervision, including 
self-regulation and auditing services by networks of microfinance institutions. 
 
In a narrower and more technical sense, sustainability includes viability, but add’s an 
organization’s ability of mobilizing its own non-subsidized resources or calculating the 
opportunity costs of grants or subsidies received, and preserves the value of its resources 
against inflation. Technically, it is measured by the financial self-sufficiency ratio (FSS): 
Financial Income/(financial costs + operating costs + loan loss provision + imputed cost 
of capital).  
 
FSS is always lower than OSS:  
135% (FSS) vs. 413 (OSS) in the case of BRI/Indonesia 
98% vs. 228% in the case of BAAC/Thailand 
119% vs. 124% in the case of Equity Building Society/Kenya 
119% vs. 145% in the case of CARD/Philippines 
 
Under conditions of high inflation, FSS is far below OSS. If an institution under conditions of 
high inflation does not account for the effects inflation by increasing its capital adequately 
(any paying a sufficiently high interest rates on the deposits, lest it impoverishes its 
depositors), it might eventually ago out of business despite a high profitability expressed in 
terms of OSS, ROA or ROE. 
 
Self-reliance matters 
Full sustainability (French: durabilité) of an institution includes the notion that the institution 
and its services will be available in the long run. However, an institution with a high FSS that 
 31relies on government or government resources may turn out to be unsustainable despite 
adequate profits and high OSS and FSS ratios if these resources are suddenly withdrawn, as 
has been the case in many countries. Donor and government funding is never sustainable! 
Thus, institutions relying on these sources of funds will eventually experience a serious 
threat to their survival, as rural banks did in the Philippines during the 1980s and 90s.  
 
In donor-supported MFIs, self-reliance is normally not stressed. In fact, self-reliance 
measures are rarely offered in the microfinance literature. An exception is the IFAD Rural 
Finance Policy (App. III/1). Self-reliance is measured by the internal resources ratio, referring 
to the extent to which an organization mobilizes its own financial resources internally instead 
of depending on government or donor funding:  
(Non-donated equity + retained earnings + deposits)/total assets. 
 
A variant is the domestic resources ratio, which includes domestic commercial borrowings in 
the numerator: 
(Non-donated Equity + Retained Earnings + Deposits + Commercial Borrowings)/Total 
Assets. 
 
The converse of self-reliance are donor and subsidy dependency. In donor- and government-
driven MFIs, the donations ratio may be used:  
Donated equity/total equity, 
with due inflation adjustments for donations and grants received in different years. 
 
 
Outreach matters …  
There are two types of outreach: saver outreach and borrower outreach. Concerning these 
two types of outreach and services, there is an asymmetry between donors together with 
governments and clients including in particular the poor: 
 
  Historically, governments and donors have had a credit bias. In many cases, 
outreach is therefore reported in terms of borrower outreach only; savers are being 
ignored. This may be justified in case of compulsory savings as a loan component, 
but not in the case of voluntary savings. 
  The people and particularly the poor have a savings bias; all people need savings 




… and so does truth in reporting
16 
There are two types of distorting effects - working in opposite directions - in international 
reporting, which is donor-driven and credit-biased: 
 
  A bias towards outreach to borrowers (as beneficiaries of donor and government 
interventions), ignoring savers, and thereby underestimating actual outreach by a 
wide margin, as in the case of most reporting by CGAP 
  Reporting of cumulative figures on the number of loans disbursed since inception of 
an institution or program, accompanied by cumulative figures on the amounts of loans 
                                                  
16 A certain difficulty lies in reporting requirements. Central banks require financial institutions to report 
on amounts of deposits and loans outstanding, not on number of clients. Banks, on the other hand, 
internally report on number of accounts, but not clients. In most rural and microfinance institutions in 
developing countries, clients would normally have one loan at any given time; so the number of loan 
accounts is close to the number of borrowers if not households. Individual clients and households are 
more likely to have several deposit account: eg, a passbook savings and account and a fixed deposit 
account; or, if special incentives are provided for opening an account or making deposits (including 
participation in a lottery), clients and households may hold several deposit accounts, as in the case of 
Bank Keshavarzi/Iran and BRI/Indonesia.  
 32ever disbursed
17, a common practice among NGOs and particularly Grameen 
practitioners, including PCFC, an apex in the Philippines refinancing Grameen 
replicators. 
 
Cumulative reporting has a tripe distorting effects: first, the amounts of loans disbursed 
during any given period are always substantially higher than loans outstanding; second, by 
adding all loans ever disbursed; third, by not writing off bad debts, which has the additional 
(unwanted) effect of lowering reported performance data in terms of arrears. 
 
The following figures illustrate the discrepancy between saver and borrower outreach of 
institutions with unbiased voluntary savings and credit services (reporting active accounts 
only, ie, with savings and balances and loans outstanding, respectively): 
 
  BRI in Indonesia has 26m savings accounts and 2.7m loan accounts; 
  BAAC in Thailand, which introduced deposit taking only around 1990, has 8.3m 
savers and 5.0m borrowers 
  Centenary Rural Development Bank in Uganda has 280,000 depositors and 22,000 
borrowers 
  Equity Building Society in Kenya has 105,000 depositors and 20,000 savers 
  Daily deposit collectors in West Africa have millions of depositors but only a handful 
of borrowers. 
 




Outreach and sustainability matter – together! 
There has been a longstanding debate, particularly among donors and credit NGOs, on the 
compatibility of sustainability and outreach to the poor. There is increasing anecdotal 
evidence that that are non only compatible, but may also be mutually reinforcing – provided 




The virtuous circle  The virtuous circle 






However, there is firm evidence that outreach and sustainability can be incompatible, namely 
under conditions of fixed and subsidized interest rates. Loans to the poor are small and 
expensive. If the interest rate is fixed, an institution has to chose between many small costly 
loans to the poor and a few cost-effective large loans to the non-poor, as most AgDBs 
historically did. However, even this holds only under conditions of equal repayment rates. 
Recent experience among rural  banks in the Philippines has shown that, with effective group 
technologies of banking with the poor, repayment rates of the poor are far higher than those 
                                                  
17  Under conditions of inflation, reporting of cumulative figures on loans disbursed is entirely 
meaningless, unless given in constant prices (which I have never seen done). 
 33of the non-poor. Similarly, many commercial banks found out that transaction costs of big 
loans may be low; but this doesn’t help if they are not repaid. 
 
Once interest rate are free and institutions charge whatever it takes to deliver loans of any 
size to any market segment, there may be direct correlation between institutional 
sustainability and outreach to the poor: The larger the number of loans with adequate interest 
rates repaid by the poor, the higher the profitability of the institution; and with higher profits 
and levels of sustainability, the institution can finance its further and more rapid expansion to 
the poor from its profits. The compatibility of sustainability to outreach applies to both 
individual and group technologies: 
 
  BRI/Indonesia is one of the most impressive cases using individual technologies, 
moving from an outreach to 700,000 subsidized borrowers in the early 1980s, with 
low repayment rates and heavy losses, to profitable financial services to 26m savings 
accounts and 2.7m active borrowers (12/2000) at high repayment and profitability 
rates. 
  Similarly, a number of rural banks, NGOs and cooperatives in the Philippines, with 
interest rate freedom, found the Grameen approach very profitable and within 2-4 
years doubled or tripled their outreach as shown below. 
 
Implications for outreach to remote and marginal rural areas: Sustainable outreach 
to remote and marginal rural areas can normally not be achieved by banks and similar formal 
financial institutions, nor by NGOs under pressures of cost-effectiveness -  unless such 
services are heavily cross-subsidized, which is rarely feasible for wide areas. Sustainable 
outreach is based on two principles: 
  The primacy of savings and self-financing, which is due to the absence of markets 
with high-yielding investment opportunities 
  Member-owned and member-managed institutions, either in the form of informal self-
help groups or cooperative societies which operate at very low financial costs. 
 
Donors may assist in the establishment and growth of autonomous local institutions with 
carefully designed and monitored small equity injections; and with training and consultancy 
services. An example is the sanduq project in Syria, built on local savings, but promoted into 
fast growth through a substantial donor input. 
 
Box 9: Sanduq, a financial innovation in a remote and marginal area of Syria 
Jabal al-Hoss is one of the poorest and remotest areas in Syria where UNDP has supported the 
establishment of self-reliant local financial institutions, sanduq (sg.) lit. savings box: a revolutionary 
concept in a command economy. The sanadiq (pl.) are self-managed and autonomous in their 
decision-making, which has included the adoption of Islamic banking. The start-up is self-financed 
through member share capital, from which small loans for up to three months are given. If initial 
financial intermediary is satisfactory, UNDP provides an additional capital injection, thereby increasing 
outreach, loan sizes and loan periods.  
 
Between September 2000 and August 2001, 16 sanadiq were established, comprising 2,611 
members, with a share capital of SP 2.6 million. UNDP contributed an excessively large amount of 
equity, SP 12.7 million; but as repayment stood at 100%, it is difficult to be critical. Anecdotal evidence 
shows that loans permit farmers to bypass trader-moneylenders and sell their produce at a higher 
price; laborers turn into farmers; and microentrepreneurs use quick-turnover repeat loans for rapid 
business growth and marketing innovations. 
 
Women opted for integrated sanadiq, in which female members manage their own affairs through 
separate women’s committees. They find access to loans easy, as sanadiq do not require physical 
collateral. Loans are used by younger and older women to do business of their own, eg, renting land 
to plant their own crops and opening small shops. The additional income is used for business growth 
and family support. It is not rare that women – among them a mother of ten - are the better 
entrepreneurs, perhaps ushering in a small social revolution. 
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MFI portfolio diversification matters  
As a risk management strategy, portfolio diversification matters for both, rural and 
microfinance institutions and their clients including their self-help groups. Sustainable 
institutions need a mixed clientele, e.g., of farmers, microentrepreneurs and small traders, 
lending for a variety of purposes; or they need a clientele with a mixed portfolio (see below). 
Portfolio decisions have to be left to the institutions. Donors and governments must abstain 
from imposing loan purposes, lest they create undue risks. 
 
 
Lending technology matters: individual vs. group technologies 
Lending technology is widely a matter of ideology, each with its own adherents, justifications, 
donors and conventions. Prominent proponents of the individual lending technology are 
USAID and HIID (with BRI as one of their disciples, after a disastrous experience with group 
lending during the days of directed credit) and Frankfurt-based IPC with its microenterprise 
banks (with Centenary RDB as one its disciples and numerous offsprings in Eastern Europe 
and the Balkans). Among the proponents of the group technology are the Grameen Bank 
and replicators, FINCA’s village banks and probably the vast majority of NGOs. However, 
choice of technology should not be a question of ideology but of proven practice. Either one 
can be done well or poorly; each is a particular form of social capital, with has its strengths 
and weaknesses. 
 
Individual technology matters: IPC’s highly successful individual technology is 
based on the following: 
 
(a) the analysis of the total household as a complex IGA entity;  
(b) an incentives-driven repeat loan system, providing access to lower-interest automatic 
loans;  
(c) flexible but comprehensive loan security requirements, including mobile and immobile 
collateral; and  
(d) stringent enforcement of timely repayment, backed up by a system of computerized 
daily loan tracking, instant recovery action and seize of collateral (such as a cow, 
refrigerator, bicycle), customer incentives, and staff performance incentives at all 
levels of the bank. 
 
An example is Centenary RDB, which was reformed by IPC (Box…). There are numerous 
other examples, including Equity Building Society in Kenya and most rural banks in 
Indonesia and the Philippines. One of them is New Rural Bank of Victorias on Negros 
Island, which has experimented with the PCFC-supported Grameen approach and with 
USAID-supported individual lending (MABS). Unlike Enterprise Bank (see below), it found 
individual lending profitable and group lending a failure.
18 The bank has 5 branches, 376 
microfinance clients under MABS, an arrears ratio of 16.5% and a return on assets of 1.6%. 
 
Group technology matters: There numerous group lending technologies which vary 
widely. One them is Linking Banks and Self-Help Groups, practiced in a relatively small 
number of countries in Asia and Africa, linking either existing SHGS (as in Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Zimbabwe) or newly established SHGs (as in India) to banks. By 1998, 800 rural banks and 
16,000 SHGs of both men and women, poor and non-poor, were involved in Indonesia, 
without any external capital funds. The largest outreach is in India, involving 461,000 newly 
established SHG (predominantly of very poor women) and some 20,000 bank branches 
                                                  
18 Starting in 1998, the bank lent P1,500 to each Grameen borrower for pig raising. Most loans failed; 
those clients who repaid were shifted to individual lending. In 2000, the bank dropped out of the 
program. It appears that GBA failed because the bank had obtained no training and did not prepare its 
clients; loans were too small, and, with loans for pigs only, risk management inadequate. In contrast, 
bank staff was properly trained in the MABS technology and the use of its manual; it set up a separate 
unit; and quality is maintained through monthly replicator meetings for coaching and problem solving. 
 35refinanced by NABARD. What distinguishes linkage banking from other group approaches is 
the treatment of SHGs as autonomous local financial intermediaries, selecting their 
borrowers, carrying out creditworthiness examinations and determining their own interest 
rates and other loan terms. Linkage banking is closely related to upgrading of SHGs to 
semiformal or formal financial institutions as a follow-up strategy.  
 
Many so-called group lending approaches do not involve lending to groups as legal 
borrowers, but lending to individuals through solidarity groups with joint liability, as in the 
case of BAAC in Thailand. 
 
The best publicized group approach is that of the Grameen Bank, which evolved in 
Bangladesh under conditions of financial repression. Its success is explained by its social 
capital, a self-regulated normative framework, which prescribes its operations in detail
19: 
 
•  a focus on poor women, gathering detailed target group information and using rigid 
selection criteria to bar the non-poor from access to its services 
•  organizing the prospective borrowers in groups of five and centers of about six groups 
each which in turn come under a Grameen branch 
•  a credit-first program design, initially financed with donor or government funds 
•  internal resource mobilization through a compulsory savings component, supplemented 
by external donor or commercial resources 
•  reliance on peer pressure and joint liability of solidarity groups as a special type of risk 
management, which allows Grameen to lend without collateral 
•  strict credit discipline with absolute insistence on timely repayment (except during natural 
disasters)  
•  weekly center meetings with compulsory punctual attendance, where a pledge is sung 
and payments are transacted with a Grameen branch officer in the presence of all 
members 
•  special conditions of financial contracts, comprising a series of one-year repeat loans to 
individual borrowers at market rates of interest, starting small (around $50) and, 
contingent upon  the group members’ repayment performance, growing bigger in 
predetermined steps and amounts, repayable in weekly instalments, with a five percent 
up-front deduction to be paid into the group’s emergency loan fund 
•  adoption of Grameen’s Ten Decisions of personal discipline to be followed in one’s daily 
life, such as growing fruits and vegetables in the backyard; abstention from drinking, 
smoking and gambling; improving one’s housing; building latrines; safe drinking water for 
better health; investing in the children’s education 
•  intensive training of members and staff to adopt the attitudes, practices and underlying 
norms and values of the Grameen approach. 
 
Many NGOs in various countries have replicated Grameen, none with Grameen’s national 
scale and legal status of a national bank; only few have achieved satisfactory outreach and 
sustainability. Grameen replication in the Philippines during the first half of the 1990s was 
largely a failure. This changed after PCFC, with support from ADB and IFAD, provided 
liquidity amounting to $34.1m to replicators, comprising NGOs, cooperatives, rural banks, 
rural cooperative banks and thrift banks. 162 MFIs have adopted GBA as a financial product, 
on-lending funds at widely varying commercial interest rates designed to cover all costs and 
allow for a profit. For 436,000 microenterprise clients – 98% of them women, –, they provide 
access to financial services. Most collection rates of participating MFIs are in the range of 
94%-100%, averaging 96.2%. The original emphasis on NGOs and cooperatives has shifted 
to banks, particularly rural banks, while some of the major NGOs involved have themselves 
established banks. Much of the success is due to three factors: the professionalism of the 
two original NGO disseminators, CARD and Negros Women for Tomorrow (NWFT); the 
                                                  
19 From CARD Operations Manual. CARD Research Unit, San Pablo City, The Philippines, 4/1998 
 36insistence on profitability resulting from high interest rates, high repayment rates and large 
outreach; and flexibility and innovation.  
 
An example is Producers Rural Banking Corporation with12 branches. In four years, it built 
up a clientele of 12,519 Grameen borrowers with loans outstanding (73% of its total 
borrowers; 13% of total loans outstanding) and 21,000 Grameen depositors (41% of its 
depositors; 4% of total deposits). Producers Bank is one of the few which has calculated the 
profitability of the Grameen product: its ROA on Grameen operations is 5.3%, and on non-
Grameen 1.5%; its ROE on Grameen is 105.6% and on non-Grameen 11.2%. Producers 
Bank uses Grameen banking as an instrument for the vigorous expansion of its branch 
network and has proposed Franchising Grameen as a BOT strategy. 
 
An interesting test case is Enterprise Bank, with 8 branches and 10 satellite offices. Like New 
Rural Bank of Victorias, it has experimented with both individual lending under USAID/MABS 
and Grameen lending under PCFC, but with different results:  
  Among its 20,944 borrowers are 14,540 under GBA (69%; 41% of loans outstanding) 
and 842 under MABS (4%; 5% of loans outstanding). 
  Past-due rates are 1.0% under Grameen and 5.6% under MABS (3.2% consolidated); 
  In 2001, 60% of profit were derived from microlending, virtually all of this from 
Grameen banking; 
  during the first half of 2002 (preliminary figures), 90% of profit were derived from 
Grameen banking. 
 
The spectacular success of Grameen banking in the Philippines in terms of repayment and 
profitability has convinced the central bank (BSP) to exempt Grameen replicators from 
collateral requirements (accepting group guarantees as a substitute) and from restrictions on 
branching out. (IFAD 7/2002) 
 
Beyond ideology:  The evidence from various developing countries shows that both 
individual and group technologies can either fail or succeed; each one can be well or poorly 
done, depending on the commitment of an institution’s management and staff to rigorously 
implement sound practices. To a certain considerable extent, the two technologies are 
complementary, as each has its own weakness:  
  in the case of Grameen banking (not necessarily linkage banking) limitations of loan 
size and resistance against joint liability for other than very small loans;  
  in the case of individual lending limited outreach.  
 
The most striking example for the limited outreach potential of individual lending among the 
rural poor is BRI in Indonesia, with 2.7m borrowers, 26m savings accounts and annual 
amounts of excess liquidity between $1bn and $1.5bn (depending on the exchange rate), 
which the Microbanking Division is unable to lend with its individual technology.
20 In contrast, 
the banks involved in Grameen banking in the Philippines have tripled or quadrupled their 
borrower outreach within just 3-4 years. 
 
Group technologies with joint liability function only at the level of small loan sizes. A way out 
found by banks and cooperatives in the Philippines is graduation, combining initial group 
lending with opportunities for graduating to larger-scale individual loans for the more 
enterprising poor. 
 
                                                  
20 Two factors have militated against the adoption of group lending by the BRI Microbanking Division: 
the distrastrous experience with directed group lending during the1970s; and the adamant insistence 
of the HIID advisory team on individual lending. BRI was involved in the GTZ-supported linkage 
banking project, but not through the Microbanking Division at village level, but through the Retail 
Division at district branch level. 
 37Innovation and flexibility matter 
No single product and strategy works everywhere. Eg, group and individual strategies work 
differently for different countries and institutions. BRI Microbanking Division in Indonesia has 
done well with a single loan product and a single major deposit product; while Bank 
Keshavarzi in Iran has done well with more than70 financial products.  
 
Blind and rigid replication without adjustment to culture and environment is a recipe for 
failure. Eg, Grameen banking with groups of five poor women has worked well in 
Bangladesh, where SHGs are largely absent, but failed in Indonesia where dozens of much 
larger SHGs exist in every village; instead, linking such pre-existing groups to banks has 
proven to be culturally far more appropriate. In contrast, the rural poor in India lack SHGs, 
but have been most receptive to NABARD’s initiative of helping them, mostly through NGOs, 
to establish new SHGs, but of an average size of 18. In Indonesia, both men and women 
organize in SHGs; in Bangladesh and in India, it is mostly women. In Africa, there is great 
variety between ethnic groups in terms of mixed vs. women-only or men-only SHGs; 
depending on the society, donor pressure on all-women’s groups may not be welcomed. 
Penalties work relatively well in parts African societies, as expressed in the bye-laws of many 
informal financial institutions. In southeast Asia, penalties lead to a loss of face; incentives 




 385.   What matters at the operational level? 
 
Good practices matter (not best practices) 
Under World Bank influence, CGAP and the microfinance community have decided that best 
practices matter. This is dangerous. It evokes the notion that optimal solutions exist in rural 
and microfinance and that they can be replicated as best practices around the world. This is 
similar to the TSP of the 1970s, a Technical Services Package promoted by the World Bank 
with mathematical precision, including rapid dissemination through an 8x8x8 formula. If only 
these farmers had listened! Just as organizations rest on their own satisficing solutions (sic!),  
(Thompson 1967), each country and each financial institution has to discover for itself which 
good practices suit them. There is no replicable package of best practices! As shown above, 
Grameen banking for example is for some a best practice and for others a worst practice.  
 
 
Institutional size matters, but… 
Institutions benefit from economies of scale; yet there is no best practice in terms of size. 
CGAP propagates that MFIs should strive for a minimum outreach of 3,000 clients (probably 
meaning borrowers, not depositors). This would be a worst rather than a best practice. BRI, 
with 26m savings accounts and excess liquidity above $1bn should strive for doubling or 
tripling its outreach to 2.7m borrowers. Some financial institutions have opted for infinite 
growth; others adhere to a house banking concept are satisfied with local outreach. In many 
countries, savings and credit cooperatives are village based and may a few thousand or a 
few hundred members; while financial self-help groups may have a few hundred or a few 
dozen members. In Germany, before the recent consolidation, there were numerous village-
based Raiffeisen banks; with a few hundred clients they were viable, sustainable and self-
reliant. Most rural banks in the Philippines have hundreds, not thousands of borrowers. In 
marginal and remote areas, sound cooperatives or SHGs may have just a few dozen or 
hundred members. 
 
Profits matter, but not absolutely  
Profits are a source of capital and loanable funds and therefore a major determinant of 
growth of outreach. It is only through profits and retained earnings that, under conditions of 
inflation, the value of the capital can be preserved. Profits are also an important indicator of 
success: of individual institutions, types of institutions, lending technology and financial 
products. At the institutional level, profits are calculated as rates of return on assets and 
equity; measuring the profitability of particular financial products – a rare but very important  
sound practice! - requires more refined calculations. Profits are also an indicator of the 





While profits are the source of incentive payments, incentives are at the same time a major 
factor bringing about profits. This requires decentralization of a financial institution and the 
transformation of branches into profit centers with their own profit and loss calculations. 
Incentives must be carefully chosen and well-balanced, lest they turn into perverse 
incentives, as in the case of disbursement-based incentives. There are no best practices in 
determining incentives. Each institution has to decide which variables enter into the 
calculation and what their relative weight is. Eg, incentives for individual performance may be 
based on the (additional) number of depositors and amount of deposits, on the (additional) 
number and amount of loans disbursed or outstanding and on the repayment rate; 
alternatively, they may be based on the profit of a branch, particularly when there is only a 
small number of staff; or on a combination of institutional, branch and individual performance 
criteria. The impact of incentives has to be carefully monitored.  
 
 39Eg, Centenary RDB in Uganda, in an effort to boost repayment, put the greatest weight on 
repayment; staff takes immediate action when instalments are late, shifting their efforts from 
disbursement of new loans to the repayment of existing loans. The result has been an 
excellent repayment performance, but a slow growth of disbursement relative to deposits, 
which implies a loss of profits from loans foregone. In this case, the costs of a high 





A high repayment rate is a result of sound practices. There are now so many institutions with 
either group or individual technologies with very high repayment rates (98%-100%) that it has 
become an art that can be taught and mastered. Two major factors are involved: 
  appropriate loan terms including size, instalments, grace periods, purpose and time of 
disbursement, which are of foremost importance; and 
  sound practices of loan enforcement, insisting on timely repayment. 
 
In the case of group lending and lending through solidarity groups, peer pressure is applied 
to enforce repayment on time; no repayment is accepted from any of the 30 members of a 
center in their weekly meetings unless the total amount due is transmitted. In individual 
lending, techniques are more complex and more variegated. They may based on incentives 
as in the case of repeat loans and interest rate rebates in BRI, on penalties, or on a 
combination. Centenary RDB is one of the institutions which has found its own perfection in 
loan recovery (Box B10).  
 
Of course, there is also a place for rescheduling, but without causing moral hazard. In a 
number of countries, repayment morale among borrowers of public banks has been 
undermined by loan forgiveness before elections and by rescheduling across the board, 
regardless of individual ability to repay, as in the case of ACC in Jordan and ACB in Syria. 
Such action is a worst practice and does great harm to borrowers: not only are they 
customers of a weak and possibly insolvent bank; they are also ineligible for further loans 




There are two types of information: computerized data and personal knowledge as part of a 
direct relationship between staff and clients, also between management and staff. 
Information on branches, financial products, clients and loans must be provided on a timely 
basis. This requires an efficient MIS, which is normally computer-based; but in small 
institutions and remote areas, manual processing of information can be far more effective. 
Cost and benefits of information processing have to be balanced. In rural and microfinance, 
personal relations with clients can be very important and cannot easily be replaced by a 
computer. Again, there is no best practice. 
 
 
Delivery systems matter 
Many financial institutions rely on customers coming to the bank, thereby transferring 
transaction costs to the clients and decreasing overall efficiency of financial intermediation. 
Bringing the bank to the people can be more efficient, eg, through decentralization, doorstep 
services and mobile services. The costs of such services must be covered by the interest 
rate; they are normally far lower than the extra costs to the borrower who has to go to the 
bank for every savings or instalment deposit. Economies of scope – combining savings and 
instalment collection – may further reduce costs. In Bank Dagang Bali in Indonesia and 
Equity Building Society in Kenya, both the institutions and their clients benefit from such 
economies of scope. 
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Box 10: Centenary RDB, Uganda: Sound practices of loan enforcement  
The Bank uses four instruments to achieve high repayment rates: incentives to repay on time; instant 
arrears information and delinquency tracking; immediate action to enforce repayment; and rigorous 
recovery in case of defaulting. 
 
A powerful incentive is built into timely repayment: As processing speed and loan appraisal costs 
decline rapidly for repeat loans, a customer qualifies after three satisfactory loan cycles for an 
automatic loan that may be granted within a day; the increment in loan size is 25% instead of 15%; 
and the monthly interest rate drops from 2.0% to 0.5% (fees and commissions remain constant), 
bringing down the effective rate from 48% to 30%.  
 
Clients are rated on the basis of their repayment performance on a scale of 1 (repayment within three 
days) to 5 (repayment after two weeks). Willful defaulters and delinquents with a rating of 5 are not 
eligible for a new loan. With a rating of 3, the volume of the follow-up loan is being reduced. With a 
rating of 2: the same loan amount may be granted again. With a rating of 1, the loan may be increased 
by 15% annually or more if justified. 
 
The loan officers have daily information on arrears and discuss this on a daily basis. In the afternoon 
of each day, they receive a list of those who paid their dues and, at any time thereafter, the list of 
delinquents and arrears. After one day, each loan officer follows up his delinquents and provides the 
information twice a week to the Recovery Committee, comprised of the branch manager, the head 
loan officer and the loan officers. Simple cases are presented but handled the individual loan officers; 
more difficult cases are handled jointly, particularly when enforcement action is to be taken.   
 
Recovery action is in the hands of a specialized recovery team of five as a group, comprising the 
head of loans and four loans officer. In extreme cases, they may request the assistance of the police. 
The recovery team goes into action for loans overdue 30 days and longer. Collateral can be seized by 
the loan officers or the recovery team on the spot in collaboration with the chairperson of the Local 
Council (LC) of each village. Seizure of collateral is either on the basis of a land title or, in the case of 
land possession without a title, in cooperation with LC chairperson. He writes a letter confirming 
possession of land and signs the mortgage agreement. The latter includes the land and the movable 
property on it, such as cows, crops and household items, all listed on the mortgage form. In the 
absence of land, movable collateral is entered into a chattel mortgage form signed only by the client. 
All the information is entered into the IMS.  
 




Financial products matter 
Financial products have to be demand-oriented and cost-effective. This requires market 
research, testing, innovation and cost calculations per product. Care has to be taken that 
studies and calculations are not confined to loan products, but include savings, insurance, 
leasing, money transfer and other products. Only few MFIs exhaust the potential of 
economies of scope; but institutions with credit only are farthest from that potential. 
 
 
Loan protection matters 
Insurance is not only a service to the customers, which my be offered cost-effectively by 
MFIs. They are also part of loan protection. In a number of countries, credit unions, reinsured 
by CUNA Madison, offer a compulsory life insurance package (avoiding adverse selection!), 
which is so attractive that in Indonesia it has become a major marketing instrument for new 
members. On Mindanao in the Philippines, several associated rural banks have established 
a cooperative hospital as a subsidiary and offer health insurance to their clients. Micro-
insurance is presently attracting increasing interest in the international microfinance 
community.  
 
 41In areas with a high incidence of AIDS, compulsory life insurance among borrowers or 
registered clients may be highly effective in spreading the risk, for financial institutions as 
well as for family members who are liable for the debts of the deceased. Much research and 
experimentation are required and need donor support to work out sound practices.
21  
 
                                                  
21 In Uganda, IFAD, among other donors has supported UWESO, a credit NGO with 8,000 women 
borrowers in Grameen groups, with special attention to AIDS orphans. With an operational self-
sufficiency ratio of 17%, no cost-effective sound practice is in sight. 
 426.  What matters to the poor? 
 
Access to savings and credit matters 
All the poor at all times need a safe place where they can accumulate their savings. All the 
poor should also have the opportunity of accessing credit; but only a limited number of the 
poor will at any given time actually avail of credit. Savings and credit also have insurance 
functions.  
 
Only financial institutions provide access to financial services on a sustainable basis. The 
unsafest place for savings is under the mattress or elsewhere in the house, where they are 
accessible to the family at any time. Thus, the poor not only need access to savings, but to 
savings institutions. This is why in West Africa, many of the poor hand their daily savings 
over to anonymous deposit collectors, who collect their savings at doorsteps against 
payment of a fee at minimal additional depositor transaction costs. Cooperatives, rural banks 
and similar MFIs are safer places; while depositor transaction costs may be higher there, 
these institutions may be able to pay interest rates above the inflation rate, thereby 
preserving the value of the savings of the poor. 
 
There may be times where access to their savings is not sufficient, as in cases of 
emergency, during lean periods or when profitable investment opportunities turn up. 
Therefore, the poor need access to financial intermediaries with both savings and credit 
services and, in a more advanced stage, other financial services such as insurance, leasing 
or money transfer.  
 
Whether access to savings-first or credit-first is more appropriate depends on the rate of 
return as shown above. Under conditions of a subsistence economy and activities with low 
returns, savings are more appropriate than credit. 
 
 
Rural enterprise viability matters 
The viability of rural financial institutions and rural farm and non-farm enterprises are closely 
interrelated and mutually reinforcing: Viable rural enterprises need viable rural financial 
institutions with sustainable financial services; while rural financial institutions need viable 




The virtuous circle  The virtuous circle 
of institutional and enterprise viability of institutional and enterprise viability
Growth Growth
Viable enterprises
Viable  financial institutions
 
 
Household portfolio diversification matters  
As a risk management strategy, portfolio diversification matters for both, rural and 
microfinance institutions and their clients, including their self-help groups.  The rural poor 
tend to invest their small-scale loans in a variety of agricultural and non-agricultural activities, 
with the double objective of livelihood security and asset or income growth. Members of 
Grameen centers in the Philippines were advised to group together along a single activity 
 43and borrow for that activity, as they do in fact – but only on paper. In reality, they found the 
advice very unwise and diversified their portfolio as illustrated below. This strategy pays off 
handsomely. Even if one activity fails, the next one succeeds, permitting experimentation 
without putting the borrower under undue risk. The increase in assets over a two- or three 
year period is usually a multiple of the total amount of loans received, indicating that what 
matters to the poor is access to loans, combined with the freedom to invest them in whatever 
is most appropriate to them (not the donor!).  
 
Table 4: Loan use and increase in assets of members of a Grameen center, People’s Bank, 
San Francisco Branch, Mindanao, after 28 months, 3/1999-7/2002 (‘000 P) 
IGA & loan purpose  3/1999  7/2002  Increase 
Vegetable selling, 2 goats, 2 pigs  0  20  20 
2 motorized tricycles (1 new, 1 second-hand)  0  50  50 
Ducks, chicken, pigs, deep well  5  60  55 
Motorized tricycle, sari sari, 2 pigs  3  70  67 
Snack selling, motorized tricycle, 3 pigs  0  40  40 
Jewellery selling, 1 pig  0  75  75 
Jewellery selling, food processing, snack selling  0  ?  ? 
Pottet plants, motorized tricycle, shoe selling  0  40  40 
Sari sari, eatery, tricycle  0  25  25 
 
 
Table 5: Loan uses and net profits of Chipangano Women’s Cooperative members, 
      Zambia (registered 3/2001) 
No  Loan  Use  Net profit Use of profit 
1  508,000  Cotton trading; profits invested in 
sunflower cake to be lold in Lusaka, 
but prices fell 
150,000  Second-hand clothes trading 
2  300,000  Cotton trading  1,640,000  Shoe trading 
3  320,000  Baking  940,000  Medical and school expenses; 
450,000 invested in business 
4  600,000  Cotton trading  2,500,000  Maize trading 
5  615,000  Second-hand clothes trading, sewing  950,000  House renovation; 350,000 
invested in business 
6  1,435,000  Trading in welding equipment, clothes, 
shoes, kitchen utensils 
1,400,000  830,000 invested in same 







Second-hand clothes trading 
Maize processing into flour (at the 
wrong season); cotton trading, won 






Invested in business 
8  870,000  Trading in table cloth, shows, kitchen 
utensils; knitting sweaters 










Saved 2m at Barclays 









1m investment from husband’s 
retirement benefits in grocery and 
clothes store 
Same business 







Business problems after 4 m. 
Still experimenting and 
learning 
Information from: 1 Fanni Ngome, 2 Iris Banda, 3 Loveness, 4 Irene More, 5 Mary Banda, 6 Malis, 
7 Vestina, 8 Dorothy, 9 Imelda, 10 Gladys Mawere 
 
 
The poor themselves matter 
Whether the poor prefer access to financial services as a separate group depends on culture 
and the financial infrastructure. In a culture of oppression and exploitation or neglect of the 
 44poor by financial institutions catering for the rich only, the poor need their own financial 
institutions, such as SHGs or cooperatives or MFIs targeting the poor. In India, when given 
access to banking services through NABARD’s SHG banking project, millions of people have 
preferred, through self-selection, to organize in self-help groups of very poor women.  
 
 
The non-poor matter 
In other cultures, which are more oriented to mutual assistance, as in parts of West Africa, 
and social harmony, as in parts of Indonesia, people prefer to organize in socially mixed 
groups or cooperatives. Wealthier people may be included because of their larger capital 
contribution (without availing of microloans), their skills and leadership qualities. In the 
Grameen replication project of PCFC in the Philippines, ADB and IFAD have insisted on 
targeting the ultra-poor; but both the poor and the local financial institutions have preferred a 
less rigid approach, in order to make better use of the personal and financial potential of the 
less poor. 
 
Indirectly, local financial institutions with financial services to the non-poor, in addition to the 
poor, grow faster and are therefore able to increase their outreach to the poor. This is 
definitely the case among the rural banks involved in the Grameen replication project in the 
Philippines. CARD, formerly an NGO, is a prominent case It lends only to poor women, but 
collects savings also from the non-poor. It now realizes that larger numbers of the non-poor 
will only deposit larger amounts of savings if they also have access to credit. So, if it wants to 
double or tripe its outreach to poor women-borrowers (presently 52,000), it will have to do 
what all rural banks do: provide a full range of financial services to all segments of the rural 
population. If financial services in a given area are only available to the poor, this will hold 
back development, with negative impact on both employment and investment opportunities 
for the poor. 
 
 
Market segments and differentiated financial products matter 
Consequently, it is market segments that matter, not targeting the poor. The poor, together 
with all segments of the population, benefit most in terms of sustainable development and 
poverty alleviation from institutions with different financial products for the poor (eg, through 
solidarity groups) and non-poor (eg, doorstep collection services of savings and instalments 




Culture of labor division matters: 
Similarly, men and women as well as local financial institutions have to be given the freedom 
of deciding for themselves whether they prefer separate or mixed institutions. Much depends 
on the culture of relations between the sexes and traditions of sexual labor division. In India, 
poor women have decided to form separate groups under NABARD’s SHG banking project; 
while very few men decided to have SHGs of their own, preferring to leave money matters to 
their wives as in many Asian cultures (eg, Laos, where women are the holders of the family 
purse). In Nepal, women decided to join the Small Farmers Cooperatives Ltd (SFCL) as 
ordinary members, arguing that their household economies were also integrated. In Jabal al-
Hoss in Syria, women opted against separate sanadiq in their respective villages, but 




In all these cases, donors and governments should abstain from targeting and other 
impositions. Instead, the autonomy of the poor, of women and of local financial institutions 
and their owners should be respected. This includes the autonomy of the poor to establish 
their own financial institutions such as cooperatives or SHGs, with or without particfipation of 
 45the non-poor. However, donors may support experimentation with particular financial 
products and services which, through self-selection, appeal more to particular market 
segments such as the poor. But sustainability will only be achieved if these products are 
accepted by the clients and the institutions independent of external support. 
 
 467.   Donor policy and coordination matter 
 
7.1 Transmitting policy to operational departments  
 
Consensus on policy: A comprehensive approach to financial systems development, also 
called financial market development, must be based on coordination, coordination and co-
financing between donors: both to prevent damaging interventions  and to create synergies. 
This requires congruous donor policies. Since the end of the Cold War, a convergence has 
taken place among donors: there is general agreement about the fundamentals of financial 
market development. There is an overall consensus, with CGAP and other donor committees 
as consensus builders, that rural and microfinance must be integrated into the overall 
development of the financial system.  
 
The challenge of transmitting policy to operational departments: This convergence 
pertains only to policy. To transmit policy from the technical advisory units to the operational 
units of donor organizations remains a major challenge. It is sometimes easier to coordinate 
the activities of different donors in a developing country than the activities of policy advisers 
and operational staff within the same donor organization. 
 
7.2 Cooperation, coordination and co-financing among donors 
 
The effectiveness of development assistance is infinitely increased by cooperation, 
coordination and co-financing among donors. Donors with a focus on a limited number of 
countries may have the opportunity of acting as a lead agency in some of them.  
 
IFAD, a special agency of the UN, focuses on poverty alleviation in rural areas as its 
mandate; and it has a special focus on rural finance. Of 236 projects with a volume of 
$2.98bn, 156 projects (66%) are rural finance projects or have a rural finance component. Of 
its total active loan portfolio of $2.98bn, $630.5m (21%) are in rural finance (2001). IFAD 
faces two problems: it has no presence in its developing member countries; and its main 
instrument are loans to countries. Close cooperation between IFAD and bilateral donors or 
technical assistance agencies would lead to synergies and more effective development 
assistance:  
 
IFAD’s  rural finance policy: 
Upon the initiative of its Board, IFAD has prepared a rural finance policy, which was adopted 
by the Board in May 2000. This policy is part of the consensus which emerged during the 
1990s in microfinance and may provide a basis for cooperation between IFAD and other 
donors. (see Box  ). In its policy, IFAD is unequivocal about the crucial importance of 
sustainable financial institutions to provide sustainable financial services to the rural poor, as 
summarized in Box   below and condensed in a single sentence: 
 
IFAD will strengthen the capacity of rural financial institutions to mobilize savings, have 
their costs covered and loans repaid, and make a profit to increase their saver and 
borrower outreach. 
 
For a comprehensive approach to the joint planning of rural finance projects in a financial 
systems perspective, IFAD has also developed a Participatory Planning Framework, which 
donors may use for their own purposes (Annex 5). 
 
Box 11:  IFAD Rural Finance Policy (Abstract) 
Rural finance is one of several essential tools to be used in combating rural poverty. The 
purpose of IFAD’s rural finance policy is to increase the productivity, income and food 
security of the rural poor by promoting access to sustainable financial services. IFAD will 
strengthen the capacity of rural financial institutions to mobilize savings, have their 
costs covered and loans repaid, and make a profit to increase their saver and 
 47borrower outreach. It may also assist in bridging gaps in equity or loanable funds until 
institutions are fully self-sustained. Creating rural finance systems is not a panacea. Nor is it 
without its challenges, among them: assuring the participation of all stakeholders; building 
rural financial infrastructures that are diversified, according to local conditions; enhancing 
institutional sustainability with outreach to the poor; and fostering a conducive policy and 
regulatory environment. IFAD’s policy will support solutions to these challenges and promote 
a diversity of strategies, among them: networking among microfinance institutions and 
establishing apex services; upgrading and mainstreaming informal finance; linking banks with 
local financial institutions and self-help groups; and transforming agricultural development 
banks. Through its policy and strategies, IFAD confirms its commitment to continually 
seeking more effective ways of enabling – and empowering – the rural poor to create a 
sustainable means of livelihood for themselves and for the generations to come. 
 
 
Standardized reporting: Reporting on rural and microfinance projects is frequently uneven 
and sometimes absent altogether. It is proposed to make use of a Financial Data Reporting 
Sheet for banks and MFIs as prepared by MIXMarket. 
 
7.3 Opening markets… 
 
The total effect of development assistance is small compared to the importance of opening 
markets in the EU and elsewhere for products from developing countries: 
 
  Donors should make every effort in the EU and elsewhere for abolishing agricultural 
subsidies and opening up markets for developing countries 
 
 48III 
Conclusions, recommendations and options 
 
(1) Sustainable development requires: 
 
  continual growth and diversification of the rural economy;  
  access of all segments of the population including rural microentrepreneurs, farmers 
and the poor to sustainable financial services such as savings, credit and insurance; 
  provided by self-reliant, sustainable financial institutions, 
  adjusted to the cultural and socio-economic conditions in their area of operation, 
  in a conducive macroeconomic policy environment. 
 
(2) Sustainable rural microfinance requires local initiative and careful donor support 
for the development of institutions, enabling them to: 
 
  offer both savings and credit services, 
  mobilize their own resources,  
  have their loans repaid, 
  cover their costs from their operational income  
  finance their expansion to the poor and non-poor from their profits. 
 
(3) Governments, with prudent donor assistance, have to provide, 
 
  a conducive policy framework with deregulated interested rates,  
  an appropriate legal framework for competitive local and national financial institutions 
with different forms of ownership, including private, cooperative, community and also 
government ownership 
  a system of prudential regulation and effective direct or delegated supervision. 
 
(4) Donors may contribute to the development of rural financial systems through: 
 
  experts for R/MF units in central banks, R/MF networks and leading R/MFIs 
  regional R/MF experts for consultancy, training, information exchange and 
supervision of donor-supported projects and MFIs 
  policy dialogue 
  social and human capacity building in financial authorities, R/MFI networks and 
R/MFIs 
  equity investments with leverage through deposit-taking, clear ownership and an exit 
option  
  no credit lines, except for bridging temporary liquidity gaps of (emerging) sustainable 
R/MFIs 
  financial and technical assistance for the transformation of MFIs into regulated 
financial institutions such as rural banks, community banks, thrift banks, commercial 
banks, finance companies or similar institutions;  
  technical and financial assistance for the promotion of ownership of financial 
institutions by the poor as shareholders, particularly in the process of transforming 
credit NGOs into regulated institutions; 
  donor coordination of financial and technical assistance, cooperation and co-financing 
making good use of the comparative advantages of multilateral and bilateral donors. 
 
 49(5) Supporting self-help groups as autonomous local financial institutions  
      in marginal areas 
 
If a donor decides to promote rural finance in marginal areas with a focus on the poor, two 
basic strategies are suggested, both directed at indigenous or new SHGs as autonomous 
local financial institutions:  
 
  Through networks or federations of SHGs, implying that both SHGs and their 
networks are being promoted in the framework of a project 
  Through linkages of SHGs with regulated financial institutions like AgDBs, rural banks 
or other types of deposit-taking financial institutions. 
 
This option would require a thorough feasibility study in each case, a long-term perspective 
or support, long-term experts, the willingness to work, in the longer run, towards a legal 
status for the SHGs or their networks or federations, and cooperation with other donors and 
regional organizations. 
 
Appropriate partners for the first approach may comprise AgDBs and development NGOs, 
which will eventually transfer their institution-building and –maintenance functions to 
networks of SHGs
22. Partners for the second approach may include AgDBs, rural banks or 




                                                  
22 An example are the federations of SHGs (promoted by Nabard) in India with the legal status of 
MACS, a new type of cooperative status. As of end-2002, Nabard has established 500,000 
autonomous SHGs with access to bank services, comprising some 40 million family members of very 
poor rural population segments. 
23 Cf. Seibel 1992; more recent manuals are available from Nabard, Mumbai. 
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